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INTRODUCTION
Americans have always agreed that an individual with a monetary
claim against the United States ought to be able to petition his gov-
ernment for a redress of this grievance. The disagreement has been over
where this petition ought to be lodged: in Congress or the federal courts.
When an individual presents a monetary claim against the United States,
two fundamental interests are involved: (1) the individual's interest in
receiving fair consideration and prompt payment of a meritorious claim;
and (2) society's interest in maintaining democratic control over the
allocation of limited public revenue among competing public needs. Given
these two competing interests, a basic question of institutional allocation
of responsibility arises. Which branch of government, Congress or the
federal courts, should have the final say in balancing the individual's
interest in payment against the public's interest in possibly competing
uses for such funds? Stated differently, should claims against the United
States ultimately be treated as fiscal questions for Congress, or legal
questions for the courts, or perhaps something in between? Moreover,
how is this latter question to be decided, and who decides it? The history
of claims against the United States is the story of how each generation
of Americans has attempted to resolve these questions. Not surprisingly,
the answers have been different over time.
This article divides American history into three periods. The first
period is called the "legislative model" and extends from colonial times
until the Civil War. During this early period, private claims were regarded
as fiscal matters that were the proper and natural province of legislative
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bodies which maintained control over the public purse-strings. Accord-
ingly, Congress, until as late as the Civil War, received and attempted
to determine private claims itself by use of its committee system or
congressional bodies subject to its control. The second period is called
the "hybrid model" and covers the period from the Civil War until
World War II. During this transitional period, the public increasingly
came to view private claims as legal rather than political matters. How-
ever, Congress was reluctant to part with its traditional authority. There-
fore, Congress continued to consider claims, particularly tort and moral
claims, while gradually authorizing other categories of claims (such as
contract and "taking" claims) to be determined by a special Court of
Claims or, in limited instances, the regular federal courts. The third
period is called the "judicial model" and extends from World War II
until the present. During this most recent period, Congress has become
overwhelmed with more pressing national and international concerns.
Thus, it has turned over to the federal judiciary the responsibility for
determining virtually all legal claims and has provided a continuing
appropriation for the payment of all judgments. This article, therefore,
traces the evolution of private claims from the legislative hall to the
courthouse.
I. THE "LEGISLATIVE MODEL": COLONIAL PERIOD TO CIVIL WAR
Congress, or bodies subject to its control, determined private claims
against the United States from the adoption of the Constitution until
the Civil War. In the early days of the republic, claims for money
against the United States were regarded as financial questions for Con-
gress and not legal questions for the courts. Private claimants were
accustomed to pressing their claims in the legislative hall rather than in
the courthouse. Legislative determination of private claims was consid-
ered a natural and appropriate legislative function, and state legislatures
as well as Congress followed this practice. However, by the Civil War,
this "legislative model" of claims determination had broken down. This
part traces: (A) the development of the "legislative model" from an
abandoned practice of the seventeenth-century English Parliament which
lived on in the colonial assemblies and the Confederation Congress; (B)
the triumph of the "legislative model" after the adoption of the Con-
stitution despite the creation of an independent judiciary; and (C) the
decline of the "legislative model" in the period prior to the Civil War
due to the inundation of Congress by claims.
A. Development-The Colonial Legislative Tradition
1. The Seventeenth Century
The seventeenth century witnessed a great struggle in England be-
tween crown and Parliament over many issues, including control of state
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finances.' After the rebellion broke out in 1642, the English became
accustomed to having the country's finances managed by parliamentary
committees2 as the rupture with the king threw much executive business
on Parliament.3 The struggle over the power to initiate and control
finances continued after the Restoration in 1660 until the "Glorious
Revolution" of 16884 when the Bill of Rights'-part of the revolutionary
settlement-finally and decisively confirmed Parliament's power over the
purse. 6 The power over appropriation, 7 however, produced an unexpected
side effect. When the money appropriated for a specific purpose was
not totally spent, it produced a surplus in the Exchequer which the
Exchequer officials were prohibited from turning over to the Crown.'
Having no executive duties, members of Parliament gradually found this
a ready source from which to satisfy the private claims of their con-
stituents. 9
There is no evidence that during this period the House of Commons
ever developed a workable process for investigating the merits of private
claimants' requests for money. 0 No standing committee was created to
investigate such claims." Apparently, such claims were treated like any
other request for money and were subject to the rule, first laid down
in 1667, that the House of Commons would not proceed on petitions
for money except in a Committee of the Whole where "any member
1. See C. Lovell, English Constitutional and Legal History 282-335 (1962).
2. F. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 309-310 (1913).
3. Jameson, The Origin of the Standing-Committee System in American Legislative
Bodies, 9 Pol. Sci. Q. 246, 257 (1894) ("The most important [parliamentary] committees
of the years from 1642 to 1656 were the committee for the advancement of money, the
army committee, the committee for taking the accounts of the kingdom, the sequestration
committee, the committee of safety, the committee of both kingdoms, and the committees
for plundered ministers, for removing obstructions in the sale of delinquents' lands, for
the relief of those who surrendered on articles of war, for compounding with delinquents,
for indemnity, and for the sale of fee-farm rents or crown lands.").
4. C. Lovell, supra note 1, at 361-414.
5. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 provides, "That levying Money for or to the
Use of the Crowne by pretence of Prerogative without Grant of Parlyament for longer
time or in other manner then the same is or shall be granted is Illegall." 1 The Law
and Working of the Constitution: Documents 1660-1914, at 69 (W. Costin & J. Watson
eds. 1961).
6. See K. Bradshaw & D. Pring, Parliament and Congress 307 (1972).
7. This was accomplished by specifying in the statute that money raised by taxation
was to be used for specific purposes and by inserting another clause that prohibited the
Lords of the Treasury from using the money for any other purpose. F. Maitland, supra
note 2, at 310.
8. K. Bradshaw & D. Pring, supra note 6, at 310.
9. Id.
10. 3 J. Hatsell, Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons 241-42 (London
1818 & photo. reprint 1971).
11. R. Harlow, The History of Legislative Methods in the Period Before 1825, at
11 (1917).
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could speak as often as he liked."' 2 Obviously, this method did not
provide a satisfactory method for the detailed review of legislation
involving money. 3 By the close of the seventeenth century, this practice
had become a brisk legislative business as a large number of private
claims were being introduced by members and passed by the House of
Commons.' 4 Thus, from its very inception the practice of legislative
claims determination was closely linked to the legislative appropriation
power itself.
The first representative colonial assembly, the Virginia House of
Burgesses, met in 1619.'1 The House of Burgesses, as would other
colonial assemblies, looked to the English Parliament for models of
practice and procedure. 6 Accordingly, seventeenth-century Parliamentary
practices are significant because they influenced the development of the
American colonial legislatures at that time. 7 The colonial assemblies'
assertion of control over colonial taxation and appropriation 8 and the
lodging of such control exclusively in the lower, popularly elected house' 9
clearly echo the seventeenth-century developments of the English House
of Commons. 20 Moreover, the parliamentary system of standing com-
mittees which developed during this time of crown conflict is said to
have made its transit to the American colonies "in the days of the later
12. 3 J. Hatsell, supra note 10, at 176-77; see also P. Thomas, The House of
Commons in the Eighteenth Century 77 (1971).
13. See P. Thomas, supra note 12, at 75.
14. Id. at 71-72.
15. J. Leake, The Virginia Committee System and the American Revolution 12 (1917).
16. This was especially true of the Mid-Atlantic and Southern colonies which developed
a more intimate relationship with England by virtue of their significant trade in agricultural
products. Many aristocratic Southerners had their children educated in England where
they became familiar with English customs. In some instances, the clerks in the assemblies
were Englishmen who had experience in Parliament and who were well acquainted with
its procedures. R. Harlow, supra note 11, at 6. It is said that the House of Burgesses
was organized nearly identical to the pattern of the seventeenth-century House of Commons
before the development of the cabinet or ministerial form of government. J. Leake, supra
note 15, at 11; see R. Harlow, supra note II, at 10.
17. R. Harlow, supra note 11, at 5.
18. See E. Greene, The Provincial Governor 116-17, 180-86 (1898). Professor Greene
stated:
In the early part of the colonial era the financial powers of the governor had
... been very extensive. The introduction of representative assemblies, however,
gradually deprived him of these abnormal powers, rendering him dependent
upon the assembly for supplies. . . . [Fiurthermore, the body which granted
money began to claim the right of determining how that money should be spent.
Hence the financial powers of the governor became very much reduced.
Id. at 117.
19. Id. at 122-23.
20. See generally C. Lovell, supra note 4.
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Stuarts." 2 It is significant, therefore, that among the first three standing
committees in the House of Burgesses was a committee on public claims. 22
While the other two committees-the committee on privileges and elec-
tions and the committee on propositions and grievances-show traces
of correspondence to then existing parliamentary committees, the com-
mittee on public claims was "strictly a colonial development. '2 All
three committees had been in active service several years before 1680.24
In creating a standing committee to investigate claims, the House of
Burgesses imported the parliamentary practice of legislative claims de-
termination and, in an American adaptation of the standing committee
system, refined the process to meet local needs.
2. The Eighteenth Century
In October 1705, the House of Burgesses further refined its claims
process by establishing a general statutory process whereby public claims
could be gathered from throughout Virginia and presented to the leg-
islature.2" At the time of the election for the House of Burgesses, the
statute required each county sheriff to give notice of the time when a
local court would convene in order to receive and certify public claims
for the next session of the General Assembly. 26 The courts were not
authorized to examine the public claims for their validity.2 7 Their sole
function appears to have been the purely ministerial one of properly
certifying the papers in question and transmitting them to the House
of Burgesses, while the task of evaluation and recommendation was
lodged in the committee of public claims.28
Ironically, in the same year when the House of Burgesses was
codifying its claims process, the private claims process in Parliament
was breaking down. In the session beginning in October 1705, the House
of Commons was inundated with a great number of petitions involving
private claims for money. 29 John Hatsell, Clerk of the House of Com-
mons from 1768-1820, later wrote that such claims were
often promoted by Members who were friends to the parties,
and carrying with them the appearance of justice or of charity,
21. Jameson, supra note 3, at 259.
22. R. Harlow, supra note 11, at 11.
23. Id.
24. The Committee on Public Claims evolved out of a joint committee which acted
as the highest court of appeal in the colony. After its judicial function was taken away
in 1680, it continued on as a House committee which investigated claims presented to
the legislature. Id.
25. J. Leake, supra note 15, at 27-28.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See generally 3 J. Hatsell, supra note 10.
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induced the rest of the House to wish well to, or at most to
be indifferent to their success; and by this means large sums
were granted to private persons improvidently and sometimes
without sufficient grounds.30
This abuse led to the conclusion that some restriction was necessary.'
On December 11, 1706, the House of Commons, at the beginning of
its session, passed a resolution prohibiting the receipt of a petition for
a grant of money for action by the Commons unless it was first rec-
ommended by the Crown.3 2 It became the practice of the Speaker,
thereafter, to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer or other person
authorized by the Crown to signify his recommendation before bringing
up such a petition.33 In 1713, the resolution of December 11, 1706 was
adopted as a standing order of the House of Commons34 and has since
become one of the cardinal principles of the British constitution. 35 The
purpose of the rule was to transfer the responsibility for determining
the merits of all grants of money, including claims, from the House of
Commons to the ministers of the Crown.3 6 Pro forma assent by the
ministers merely to permit parliamentary consideration was considered
destructive of the spirit and meaning of the resolution.3 7 This was
regarded as a failure of the ministers' duty to inspect and recommend
and, in claims involving difficult equitable considerations, as a failure
of the ministers' courage as well.38
The reasons for the House of Commons' self-restriction on its au-
thority over money grants, which no one dreamed of contesting,39 have
various explanations. Obviously, the Commons quickly concluded it was
an ill-suited forum for the investigation of claims 40 and therefore subject
to abuse. 41 In the words of one commentator it was "a measure of
protection against the easy extravagance of a large assembly." ' 42 More-
30. Id. at 242.
31. Id. at 241-42.
32. The resolution of December 11, 1706, stated "[tihat this House will receive no
Petitions for any sum of Money, relating to publick Service, but what is recommended
from the Crown." 1 W. Costin & J. Watson, supra note 5, at 197.
33. 3 J. Hatsell, supra note 10, at 242.
34. Id.
35. K. Bradshaw & D. Pring, supra note 6, at 309 ("Though it has been a standing
order of the House since 1713, it has never been made statutory and could theoretically
be overthrown by a simple majority of the House. Yet the principle has stood for more
than 250 years, and the terms of the standing order have been reaffirmed and spelt out
on several occasions.").
36. 3 J. Hatsell, supra note 10, at 243.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 3 J. Redlich, The Procedures of the House of Commons 122 (1908).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
41. P. Thomas, supra note 12, at 71.
42. 3 J. Redlich, supra note 39, at 122.
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over, the English courts, even during this period, could often provide
an alternative forum where private claimants could press their grievance
against the Crown or its officials 3.4  However, the basic reason appears
to have been much more fundamental. Despite the civil war and the
"Glorious Revolution," the English constitution "remained monarchical
in essence." ' 44 After a period of experimentation in the later seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries, the English returned to their traditional
pattern of the Crown initiating requests for expenditures, but now with
the Crown acting through ministers responsible to Parliament itself.45
This was a part of a larger development toward cabinet government.4 6
The early eighteenth-century transfer of claims determination in Eng-
land from Parliament to Crown produced no corresponding change in
the practice of the American colonial assemblies. By this time, the
practice appears to have been firmly entrenched. For example, in Vir-
ginia, in 1715, when certain county judges neglected to hold court to
receive and certify claims for transmittal to the House of Burgesses,
the House became so outraged that it ordered some of the offending
judges prosecuted for neglect of duty, and had others arrested and
43. For an excellent review of the available methods, see Jaffe, Suits Against Gov-
ernment and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1963). "From time
immemorial many claims affecting the Crown could be pursued in the regular courts if
they did not take the form of a suit against the Crown. And when it was necessary to
sue the Crown eo nomine consent apparently was given as of course. Long before 1789
it was true that sovereign immunity was not a bar to relief." Id. at 1. During the early
eighteenth century, the easiest method for recovering ordinary money claims was to file
a petition in chancery for a writ of liberate that would order the Exchequer to pay, or
direct the barons of the Exchequer to hear, the claim. See 9 W. Holdsworth, A History
of English Law 21, 33, 35 (1926). In 1700 the High Court of Parliament, in the famous
Case of the Bankers, affirmed that in certain instances a petition could also be filed
directly with the barons of the Exchequer for payment of money owed by the crown.
This case and numerous related cases are collected in volume 14 of Howell's State Trials
(1816). For a good discussion of this case, see 9 W. Holdsworth, supra, at 32-39, and
W. Richardson, History of the Court of Augmentations, 1536-1554, at 472-74 (1961). The
petition of right, due to its complicated procedural technicalities, appears to have dropped
out of use during this period. 9 W. Holdsworth, supra, at 8, 9, 22-26. In fact, one writer
states that there is "no trace of a petition of right from 1605 until the nineteenth century."
H. Street, Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study 1, 2 (1953). Not until the
nineteenth century was the petition of right revived in England with the adoption of the
Petition of Right Act of 1860, 23 & 24 Vict. ch. 34,. § 2 (repealed by Crown Proceedings
Act of 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, ch. 44, § 39), and the scope of its remedy expanded to
contract actions. Feather v. The Queen, 6 B. & S. 257, 295, 122 Eng. Rep. 1191, 1205
(Q.B. 1865).
44. K. Bradshaw & D. Pring, supra note 6, at 309.
45. Id. ("[B]y leaving the power of initiating expenditure to the Crown (that is, the
government) the House has ultimately confined its own function in the field of supply
and appropriation to criticism of what the government does.").
46. See Jameson, supra note 3, at 259-61.
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physically brought before it where the judges were ordered to make "an
humble acknowledgment of their error at the bar of the House." ' 47 By
the close of the colonial period, almost all the colonial legislatures had
developed a standing committee on "claims" or "grievances;" these
committees were to continue after independence.
4
1
Several reasons can be offered for the continuation of legislative claims
determination in the colonial legislatures. First, unlike Parliament, the
colonial legislatures developed the practice of creating standing com-
mittees to investigate claims. 49 Given the undoubtedly smaller volume
of claims, this procedure appears to have adequately served colonial
needs.5 0 Second, the colonial judiciary was subject to great control by
the English governors" who appointed the judges5 2 and participated in
hearing appeals in civil cases.. This forum was hardly an attractive
alternative for pursuing a monetary grievance against the colonial gov-
ernment itself.5 4 Finally, the English solution was unthinkable in the
American colonies. Colonial legislators who won prominence tended to
be aggressive, self-confident politicians whose frontier spirit made them
contemptuous of the English governors and administrators sent over
from England. 5 Unlike the English Parliament, which relinquished budget
initiative to ministers of the Crown responsible to it under the developing
cabinet system5 6 the colonial assemblies stubbornly fought for and largely
succeeded in superseding the English governor's control over all colonial
finances .7
By the close of the colonial period, American politicians and public
alike considered legislative determination of claims a natural and ap-
propriate aspect of the legislative power over appropriations. Their co-
lonial experience admitted no other model. After independence had been
achieved, the American experience under the Articles of Confederation
would simply reinforce this aspect of the colonial legislative tradition.
47. J. Leake, supra note 15, at 28.
48. See R. Harlow, supra note 11, at 259-62.
49. R. Harlow, supra note 11, at 11, 259-61.
50. Id. at 16 ("Every case, no matter how trivial it seemed, was given a fair hearing.").
51. See E. Greene, supra note 18, at 133-44.
52. The colonial governors appointed the judges and justices of the peace with the
consent of the council. However, in the latter colonial period, the provincial chief-justice
was appointed by the crown. Id. at 134.
53. Id. at 140. Although appeal to the home government was possible if large sums
of money were involved, this process was necessarily inconvenient, expensive, and im-
practical in most cases. Id. at 140-41.
54. Id. at 141. See H. Glick & K. Vines, State Court Systems 19-21 (1973).
55. R. Harlow, supra note 11, at 2.
56. See K. Bradshaw & D. Pring, supra note 6, at 309-10.
57. See E. Greene, supra note 18, at 180-86.
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3. Articles of Confederation (1781-1789)
Under the Articles of Confederation, the states sought to maintain
their individual sovereignty.58 Fearing a strong central government, 9 they
limited the powers granted to it. The powers that were delegated were
placed in the hands of Congress, where each state had one vote. 60 No
independent executive branch was created. Instead, the Confederation
Congress was merely authorized to appoint a "Committee of the States"
to sit during their recess and "to appoint such other committees and
civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of
the United States, under their direction." '6' Also, no national judiciary
was created. Disputes between states were ultimately to be decided by
Congress. 62 With regard to the determination of claims against the United
States, the Articles of Confederation, consistent with previous colonial
legislative practice, provided that they were to be defrayed only if
"incurred . . .and allowed by the United States, in Congress assem-
bled.' '63
After the Revolutionary War, 64 the Confederation Congress, in 1784,
created a three-member Board of Treasury to supervise and manage the
new nation's finances. 65 Its most important duty was that of settling
the numerous accounts and claims which had arisen out of the war. 66
The Board, however, was far from independent. The Confederation
Congress concerned itself with even small matters of finance and directed
the Board at almost every point. 67 The numerous claims or "memorials"
sent to Congress were referred to the Board for investigation.'6 8 The
58. Article 2 of the Articles of Confederation declared, "Each State retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which
is not by this confederation, expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assem-
bled." For an excellent discussion of the struggle over sovereignty, see M. Jensen, The
Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the
American Revolution, 1774-1781, at 161-76 (1940).
59. M. Jensen, The New Nation 347 (1950).
60. Arts. Confed. art. 5, § 4 (1781, superseded 1789).
61. Arts. Confed. art. 9, § 5 (1781, superseded 1789).
62. Arts. Confed. art. 9, § 2 (1781, superseded 1789).
63. Arts. Confed. art. 8, § 1 (1781, superseded 1789) (emphasis added).
64. Due to wartime necessity, the Confederation Congress established a Department
of Finance, headed by the controversial Robert Morris, to supervise the nation's finances
during the first three years (1781-1784) under the Articles of Confederation. See J. Sanders,
Evolution of Executive Departments of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, at 128-45
(1971).
65. 27 Library of Congress, Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, at 469
(G. Hunt ed. 1928) [hereinafter cited as Journals Cont'l Cong.]. The three Board positions
were filled by members coming from the Northern, Middle, and Southern states. J.
Sanders, supra note 64, at 147.
66. J. Sanders, supra note 64, at 148-49.
67. Id. at 151. .,
68. M. Jensen, supra note 59, at 371.
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Board normally required written documentation for claims, 69 heard evi-
dence, and reported back to Congress70 which had the sole power to
authorize payment. 7' Most of the claims were quite small. For example,
they included requests for reimbursement for cattle procured for the
army,72 compensation for special intelligence gathering against the en-
emy, 73 supplementation of pay affected by the depreciation of currency,7 4
and payment for a home and tools destroyed to prevent them from
falling into enemy hands. 75 Not all claims brought before the Board
were based on what normally would be considered a legal right. Many
were filed by "hopeful souls who saw a chance to make something out
of the confusion. ' '7 6 Thus, claims by Revolutionary War widows, spec-
ulators, and persons lacking adequate documentation were rejected. 77
It has been suggested that the practice of congressional claims deter-
mination after the adoption of the Constitution in 1789 can be traced
to precedents established by the Confederation Congress when there was
no independent executive or judicial branch of government. 78 While in
a sense true, this analysis fails to give sufficient weight to the colonial
legislative tradition of claims determination which can be traced, as we
have seen, to at least as early as 1680 in the Virginia House of Bur-
gesses-a full century before. 79 Moreover, it does not explain why all
the newly established states-which began to create independent state
judiciaries during this period 80-also continued the practice of legislative
69. Although normally required, documentation was not always insisted on by the
Treasury Board. For example, a Colonel Livingston submitted a claim for provisions and
boards purchased for the army. The Board recommended payment stating that "Colonel
Livingston having lost all his Papers and Vouchers on the Retreat from Quebec, the exact
Balance cannot be ascertained with that accuracy which the usual Forms of the Treasury
require. From the Character of Col. Livingston, the Board are of Opinion, the balance
appearing due . . . should be allowed to him." 30 Journals Cont'l Cong., supra note
65, at 201 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1934).
70. M. Jensen, supra note 59, at 371.
71. See Arts. Confed. art. 8 (1781, superseded 1789).
72. 30 Journals Cont'l Cong., supra note 65, at 205 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1934).
73. Id. at 207.
74. Id. at 203-04.
75. Id. at 222-24.
76. M. Jensen, supra note 59, at 371.
77. Id. at 371-72.
78. Wiecek, The Origin of the United States Court of Claims, 20 Ad. L. Rev. 387,
389 (1968) ("The problem of claims against the central government antedated the Con-
stitution. The Confederation Congress, in its handling of this problem, established prec-
edents which influenced the later disposition of claims long after the reasons underlying
the Confederation procedures ceased to exist . . . Three factors determined the choice
of a method for handling claims against the Confederation: The lack of administrative
machinery, the lack of a separate national judiciary, and Congress' dissatisfaction with
the performance of Robert Morris, the powerful superintendent of finance.").
79. See R. Harlow, supra note 11.
80. See H. Glick & K. Vines, supra note 54, at 21-22.
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determination of claims."
Early state courts respected the traditional legislative jurisdiction over
claims s2 For example, in Black v. Rempublicam,83 the plaintiff sued the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in a Pennsylvania state court for the
value of goods confiscated in 1776 in order to keep them from the
British. The state court concluded that it had no jurisdiction under
Pennsylvania law to provide relief and simply stated what was at that
time the obvious: "The remedy of the plaintiffs, if any of the provisions
have come to the particular benefit of the state, is by application to
the legislature, who have reserved these extraordinary powers to them-
selves." ' 84 In fact, one of the principal arguments raised by the Anti-
Federalists against the proposed Constitution was that it would permit
claims against the states to be determined judicially by the proposed
federal courts, rather than legislatively by the states themselves. 8' The
popular strength of the then prevailing "legislative model" is demon-
strated by the fact that Hamilton and other Federalists felt the need to
deny vehemently that such an unthinkable proposition was So.8" Ac-
81. See R. Harlow, supra note 11, at 259-61.
82. See Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 445-
446 (1793); see also Respublica v. Sparhawk, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 357 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1788).
83. 1 Yeates 139 (Pa. 1792).
84. Id. at 142.
85. One Anti-Federalist, writing under the pseudonym "Brutus," made this point in
an essay published February 21, 1788, with regard to the provision which would extend
the jurisdiction of the proposed federal courts to controversies between a state and citizens
of another state. Brutus stated, "It is improper, because it subjects a state to answer in
a court of law, to the suit of an individual. . . .The states are now subject to no such
actions. . . . [lndividuals never had in contemplation any compulsory mode of obliging
the government to fulfil its engagements." 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 429 (H. Storing
ed. 1981) (footnote omitted). Other Anti-Federalists suggested that the state legislatures
would be "prostrated" by such a provision. J. Main, The Anti-Federalists: Critics of the
Constitution, 1781-1788, 157 (1961).
86. In Federalist No. 81, Alexander Hamilton notes that the issue of suits against
the states in federal court has "excited some alarm upon very mistaken grounds." Hamilton
then attempts to set the matter to rest by stating that:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general
practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty,
is now enjoyed by the government of every state in the union . . . . [Tlhere
is no colour to pretend that the state governments, would by the adoption of
that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own
way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of
good faith.
The Federalist No. 81, at 548-49 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited to
this edition without reference to editor]. James Madison stated, "It is not in the power
of individuals to call any state into court." 3 J. Elliot, The Debates in the Several State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 533 (2d. ed. Philadelphia 1836).
In the same Virginia Ratification Convention, John Marshall concurred in Madison's
estimation:
I hope that no gentlemen will think that a state will be called at the bar of
the federal court. Is there no such case at present? Are there not many cases
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cordingly, at the time of the establishment of the Constitution, the
"legislative model" of claims determination was a firmly established
part of the American political tradition at both the state and national
levels. However, the creation of the new federal judiciary was beginning
to raise disturbing questions.
B. Triumph-Congress Over Court In The Early Republic
1. Early Struggle (1789-1794)
After the adoption of the Constitution on March 4, 1789, the First
Congress moved quickly to maintain legislative dominance over the
determination of claims. Even before it took steps to implement the
new federal judiciary,8 7 Congress instituted, on September 2, 1789, a
transfer of the claim-reviewing function to the auditors and the Comp-
troller within the newly established Treasury Department.8s This was the
same general method of determining claims that had been employed
under the Articles of Confederation; 9 however, Congress did not intend
to relinquish ultimate control of claims by this action.9° Claimants dis-
satisfied with the Comptroller's decision could still appeal to Congress.9'
Moreover, Congress could effectively overrule a Comptroller's award by
simply refusing to appropriate the necessary funds. 92 With the advent
of the federal judiciary, the conceptual problems which this approach
in which the legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet the state is not sued?
It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before
a court.
Id. at 555. However, a few Federalists, such as James Wilson (who would later rule on
this question as a Justice of the Supreme Court), disagreed. Wilson stated, "When a
citizen has a controversy with another State, there ought to be a tribunal where both
parties may stand on a just and equal footing." I J. McMaster & F. Stone, Pennsylvania
and the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788, at 356 (1888 & photo. reprint 1970).
87. The act creating the Department of Treasury was adopted on September 2, 1789.
See Act of September 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65 (1845). The act implementing the federal
judiciary was adopted on September 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1845).
88. 2 W. Cowen, P. Nichols & M. Bennett, The United States Court of Claims 4
(1978); 216 Ct. Cl. 4 (1978).
89. See Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65, 66-67 (1845). Specifically, § 5 of
this act provides that "it shall be the duty of the Auditor to receive all public accounts
[i.e., all claims], and after examination to certify the balance, and transmit the accounts
with the vouchers and certificate to the Comptroller for his decision thereon: Provided,
That if any person whose account shall be so audited, be dissatisfied therewith, he may
within six months appeal to the Comptroller against such settlement."
90. See 2 W. Cowen, P. Nichols & M. Bennett, supra note 88, at 5.
91. Wiecek, supra note 78, at 389.
92. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9 ("No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but
in consequence of appropriations made by law."); see also 2 W. Cowen, P. Nichols &
M. Bennett, supra note 88, at 5.
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created were not lost on Representative James Madison. 93 Madison clearly
saw that the powers being conferred on the Comptroller were judicial
rather than executive in nature.94 Therefore, he argued during the debates
that there should be a right to review in the Supreme Court to insure
impartiality. 9 Congress, however, rejected this idea, preferring to main-
tain control over claims without judicial interference. Three weeks later,
on September 24, 1789, this sentiment again found expression when
Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789 and extended federal court
jurisdiction over the federal government to only those situations where
"the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners ' 96 and omitted reference
to defendant or respondent status. 97
Despite lodging certain authority in the Treasury Department to
review claims, the First Congress, unlike Parliament,9" had no intention
of making that process exclusive. Less than a month later, on September
29, 1789, Congress enacted its first private claims bill. 99 By this time
the "legislative model" of claims adjudication was too firmly entrenched
in the minds of both politician and public to permit any drastic break
with the past. Seven hundred and four private and public petitions were
presented to the First Congress. 00 Congress responded to the petitions
by referring them to the appropriate Secretary in the executive branch,
or to a special legislative committee for examination and recommendation
back to Congress. 0
Congressional dominance was not to go unchallenged by the new
federal judiciary. In 1792 and 1793, the Supreme Court handed down
two cases: Hayburn's Case0 2 and Chisholm v. Georgia.03 In these cases
93. 1 Annals of Cong. 611-14 (J. Gales ed. 1834).
94. Id. at 611-12 ("It seems to me that they partake of a Judiciary quality as well
as Executive; perhaps the latter [sic?] obtains in the greatest degree. The principal duty
seems to be deciding upon the lawfulness and justice of the claims, and accounts subsisting
between the United States and particular citizens; this partakes strongly of the judicial
character, and there may be strong reasons why an officer of this kind should not hold
his office at the pleasure of the Executive branch of the Government.") (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 612.
96. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78 (1845).
97. This ommission has been deemed significant. See Williams v. United States, 289
U.S. 553, 573-74, 53 S. Ct. 751, 757-58 (1933).
98. See discussion supra notes 25-46; see also H.R. Rep. No. 730, 25th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1838), where the difference between Parliament and Congress with respect to
claims is briefly discussed.
99. See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 26, 6 Stat. 1 (1846). This act allowed the Baron
de Glaubeck the pay of captain for services rendered during the Revolutionary War.
100. H.R. Rep., supra note 98, at 4.
101. Id. at 2. However, very few of these claims appear to have resulted in private
legislation. See the private acts of the First Congress in volume six of the United States
Statutes at Large (1846).
102. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
103. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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the court sought to establish the finality of federal judicial decisions
with respect to claims against the United States, and implicitly, exclusive
jurisdiction to decide those claims.
In 1792 Congress passed a statute designed to settle various pension
claims of widows, orphans, and others arising out of the Revolutionary
War.' Not wishing to create a new bureaucracy,105 Congress assigned
the task of reviewing and certifying the claims to the new federal circuit
courts which were to transmit their decisions to the Secretary at War.10 6
Congress, however, had no intention of surrendering its control over
claims since section 4 of the Act contained the following qualification:
"Provided always, That in any case, where the said Secretary shall have
cause to suspect imposition or mistake, he shall have power to withhold
the name of such applicant from the pension list, and make report of
the same to Congress, at their next session."' 0 7 Several courts refused
to hear claims under this act on the grounds that the act failed to
accord finality to their decisions. 08 The position of the New York Circuit
Court was representative of this view: "[Bly the Constitution, neither
the Secretary at War, nor any other Executive officer, nor even the
Legislature, are authorized to sit as a court of errors on the judicial
acts or opinions of this court."' 0 9 The courts' positions caused quite a
stir in Congress since these cases provided the first instances in which
an act of Congress had been declared unconstitutional. 0 The Attorney
General filed an action in the Supreme Court to compel the Circuit
Court to hear the claim of one William Hayburn.1" In the meantime,
Congress amended the Act so that the federal court's role was limited
to fact finding, i.e., taking evidence and transferring it to the Secretary
of War for his determination. ' 2 Apparently, this change satisfied the
federal courts since no judicial determination of the merits was involved" 3
and the matter was resolved without need for the Supreme Court to
formally decide the question." 4 However, the message was clear: the
104. Act of March 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243 (1845).
105. At the time, the duties of the new Federal court judges were relatively light. C.
Haines, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government and Politics, 1789-
1835, at 133 (1944).
106. Act of March 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243, 244 (1845).
107. Id. § 4, 1 Stat. 243, 244.
108. See the notes of the reporter accompanying Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at
410-14.
109. Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
110. 2 Annals of Cong. 557 (1849).
111. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409.
112. Act of February 28, 1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 324 (1845).
113. The New York Circuit Court had suggested that, in deference to the intent of
Congress, it might be willing to "execute this act in the capacity of commissioners."
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410.
114. Id. at 409-10. But see United States v. Yale Todd, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 52 note
(1851) (footnote discussion of case inserted by Chief Justice Taney).
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federal judiciary would insist that their judgments be accorded finality
and not be subject to revision by either the executive or legislative
branches.
In 1793, the Supreme Court, in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia,"5
confronted the thorny question ' 6 of whether or not the constitutional
grant of judicial authority over "controversies . . . between a State and
citizens of another State" 7 meant that a state could be sued without
its consent. Although the case specifically related to a claim filed by
an individual against the State of Georgia, the Court's decision would
necessarily provide an important precedent for a closely related question:
whether the Court could entertain a suit against the federal government
without its consent under the parallel constitutional provision which
extended its jurisdiction "to controversies to which the United States
shall be a party.""' 8 The fundamental question raised was whether, tinder
the new Constitution, claims against the states (and by analogy the
federal government) were to be considered legal questions for the courts
or financial questions for the appropriate legislative body. The signifi-
cance of the case on both the state and Federal levels was recognized
at the time by both Court and counsel. Edmund Randolph,"19 the At-
torney General, argued in favor of the Court's ability to entertain the
action against the State of Georgia by relying heavily on the literal
language of the Constitution, 20 but he was careful to point out "that
it will not follow, from these premises, that the United States themselves
may be sued. For the head of a confederacy is not within the reach of
the judicial authorities of its inferior members. It is exempted by its
peculiar pre-eminencies."I'2
By a four to one vote, the Supreme Court upheld the ability of
the federal courts to hear suits filed against the states without their
consent.' 22 The Justices rendered their opinions seriatim. The lone dis-
senter was Justice Iredell who-after tracing the history of the English
petition of right-concluded that a state, as a sovereign, could only be
sued with its consent and, since there were no longer any kings, such
115. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
116. Although the question was apparently not debated by the drafters, it became the
subject of intense debate during the ratification process. R. Spurrier, To Preserve These
Rights 39-40 (1977).
117. U.S. Const. art. I11, § 2.
118. Id.
119. Interestingly, at the Philadelphia Convention Edmund Randolph was a member
of the Committee of Detail which drafted Article III of the Constitution. C. Jacobs, The
Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 15-18 (1972).
120. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 420-25.
121. Id. at 425.
122. Id.
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consent must be given by the legislative branch.' 23 The opinions of the
majority (Blair, Wilson, Cushing, and Jay) instead found that the Court
could hear claims against the states without their consent, and left open
the question of its jurisdiction over the federal government involving
similar suits. However, there were some hints that the majority might
decide the question the same way against the federal government although
their opinions sent out mixed signals. Justice Blair's insistance on relying
on the literal language of the Constitution 24 and Justice Wilson's phil-
osophical rejection of all doctrines which placed the government in a
superior position to an individual 25 strongly implied that they might
decide that the federal government, like the states, could be sued without
its consent. Justice Cushing, on the other hand, appeared to lean against
a construction of the Constitution which would permit the federal gov-
ernment to be sued without its consent due to "the different wording
of the different clauses, connected with other reasons."'12 6 Finally, Chief
Justice Jay discussed the implications of their decision on the Court's
jurisdiction over a fedefal defendant and candidly admitted the dilemma
that he saw: the literal language of the Constitution suggests jurisdiction
over the federal government but practically, "there is no power which
the courts can call to their aid' '127 to enforce their decisions in such a
situation. Chief Justice Jay closed with a philosophic lament that perhaps
the nation was not ready to accept such a role by the judiciary, and
therefore, "I leave it a question.' ' 28
123. Id. at 446 ("The only constituted authority to which such an application could
with any propriety be made, must undoubtedly be the Legislature, whose express consent,
upon the principle of analogy, would be necessary to any further proceeding. So that
this brings us (though by a different route) to the same goal: The discretion and good
faith of the Legislative body.").
124. Id. at 450 ("The Constitution of the United States is the only fountain from
which I shall draw; the only authority to which I shall appeal. Whatever be the true
language of that, it is obligatory upon every member of the Union.").
125. Id. at 461 ("Even in almost every nation, which has been denominated free, the
State has assumed a supercilious preeminence above the people, who have formed it:
Hence the haughty notions of State independence, State sovereignty and State supremacy.
In despotic Governments, the Government has usurped, in a familiar manner, both upon
the State and the people: Hence all arbitrary doctrines and pretensions concerning the
Supreme, absolute, and incontrolable pqwer of Government. In each, man is degraded
from the prime rank, which he ought to hold in human affairs.").
126. Id. at 469 ("As to reasons for citizens suing a different State, which do not
hold equally good for suing the United States; one may be, that as controversies between
a State and Citizens of another State, might have a tendency to involve both States in
contest, and perhaps in war, a common umpire to decide such controversies, may have
a tendency to prevent the mischief.").
127. Id. at 478.
128. Id. ("I wish the State of society was so far improved, and the science of
Government advanced to such a degree of perfection, as that the whole nation could in
the peaceable course of law, be compelled to do justice, and be sued by individual citizens.
Whether that is, or is not, now the case, ought not to be thus collaterally and incidentally
decided: I leave it a question.").
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The majority straddled the federal question but clearly did not
foreclose the possibility that it might extend Chisholm-at least some
time in the future. The implications of Hayburn's Case and Chisholm,
which were reported virtually one after the other, would leave little
doubt that: (1) the federal courts would not tolerate congressional re-
vision of their decisions on federal claims within their jurisdiction; and
(2) the Supreme Court, at a minimum, believed that the question of
whether the Constitution specifically granted it jurisdiction to decide
such claims against the federal government was the Court's decision
through constitutional interpretation. A new concept of claims deter-
mination-based on the rule of law-was being asserted by the new
federal judiciary. 29 The challenge to the colonial "legislative model"
was unmistakable.
The reaction to this early assertion of judicial authority was swift
and strong.130 The Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia
"created . . . a shock of surprise throughout the country"'' and led
to the immediate introduction (February 20, 1793) in Congress of a
proposed constitutional amendment to nullify its effect. 3 2 Thereafter,
the proposed Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution was adopted
almost unanimously in 1794 by the Third Congress 3 and swiftly ratified
by the requisite number of state legislatures. 3 4 This amendment provided
that the federal court had no jurisdiction over suits against states brought
by citizens of other states or other countries.'35
The reasons for the widespread support for the Eleventh Amendment
have traditionally been viewed in the context of federalism, i.e., the
struggle of the states to maintain their fiscal independence from federal
intrusion and coercion at a time when state debts were matters of
significant concern. 3 6 While this analysis explains the support of states'
129. See C. Haines, supra note 105, at 131 ("But a new theory of the separation of
powers and judicial independence was emerging, and with this came a different concept
of the relation of the Judges to the other departments of government. This new concept
was summed up in the doctrine that there was to be established in America 'a government
of laws and not of men."') (footnote omitted).
130. For. an excellent discussion, see C. Jacobs, supra note 119, at 64-74.
131. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, 11 (1889).
132. 2 Annals of Cong. 651-52 (1849). The Second Congress adjourned a few weeks
later, however, without taking any action on this proposal.
133. The vote in the Senate was 23 to 2 (January 14, 1794) and in the House 81 to
9 (March 4, 1794). 3 Annals of Cong. 30, 477 (1855).
134. By February of 1795, the requisite number of states appear to have ratified the
Eleventh Amendment, although the official certification of passage by President Adams
did not take place until early 1798. C. Jacobs, supra note 119, at 67.
135. The Eleventh Amendment states, "The judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of a
foreign state."
136. See C. Jacobs, supra note 119, at 67-74; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 406 (1821).
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rights advocates and the relatively prompt ratification by the state leg-
islatures, it does not adequately explain the widespread Federalist party
support in Congress."" Federalist support was probably less influenced
by concerns over state rights than by concerns over the proper allocation
of responsibilities among the various branches of the federal government.
Hamilton, for example, saw the judiciary as the "weakest" of the three
branches with "no influence over either the sword or the purse."' 3 8 And
Hamilton, as did other Federalists, clearly believed that claims against
the United States involved matters of "the purse."' 3 9 While the states
saw an attack on states' rights in Chisholm v. Georgia, the Federalists,
particularly in light of Hayburn's Case, also saw an attack on the
traditional "legislative model" of claims adjudication. Watkins recog-
nizes this point when he notes that "[a] wave of apprehension spread
over the country at this unheard of and totally unexpected deviation
from the accepted course of non-judicial adjustment or judicial non-
adjustment of state debts."'' 4 The adoption of the Eleventh Amendment,
therefore, was not only a victory for state rights but a "stinging rebuke' ' 4'
to the Court's assault on the "legislative model" of claims adjudication.
Moreover, subsequent history indicates that the Supreme Court under-
stood it as such. 142
2. Congressional Adjudication (1794-1838)
After Hayburn's Case in 1792 and Chisholm v. Georgia in 1793,
Congress became reluctant to authorize claims against the United States
for hearing in federal courts due to the judiciary's insistence that its
decisions be final and not subject to executive or legislative revision. 43
Some believed that if a court were authorized to decide claims against
the federal government, Congress might be compelled to pay in violation
of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution which provides that "no
money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appro-
137. C. Jacobs, supra note 119, at 71 ("Support for the amendment by states' rights
men was, of course, to be expected. . . . It is more dificult to account for Federalist
support of the amendment.").
138. The Federalist No. 78, at 522-23 (A. Hamilton) ("The legislature not only com-
mands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen
are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword
or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can
take no active resolution whatever.").
139. See discussion supra note 86.
140. R. Watkins, The State as a Party Litigant 53 (1927).
141. Id. at 54 ("It would scarcely be expected, however, that, after the stinging rebuke
administered to the judges for their interpretation of the status of a State at common
law, there would be necessity for similar direct action if an attempt were made to make
the Federal Government a defendant.").
142. Id.
143. See 2 W. Cowen, P. Nichols & M. Bennett, supra note 88, at 5.
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priations made by law."' 44 Congress, however, did not want to part
with its ultimate control over claims' 5-the colonial legislative tradition
ran too deep to permit relinquishment of such purse-strings control.
Accordingly, Congress adopted two policies which effectively established
the colonial "legislative model" of claims adjudication in the new re-
public.
First, Congress established procedures for determining claims itself. 46
On November 14, 1794 the House established, for the first time, a
Committee of Claims 47 whose duty was defined as follows: "to take
into consideration all such petitions . . . claims or demands on the
United States, as shall be presented, or . . . referred to them by the
House, and to report their opinion thereupon, together with .
propositions for relief . ..as . . .shall seem expedient.' ' 4 Under this
rule, the Committee of Claims had jurisdiction over all money claims
against the United States including private land claims, pension claims,
and public land claims. 49 During the next ten years, the Committee of
Claims appears to have functioned tolerably well given the relatively
low volume of petitions filed.'50 As business increased, however, the
House occasionally created other committees and assigned to them special
categories of claims: in 1805, a Public Lands Committee; in 18:13, a
Pension and Revolutionary Claims Committee; in 1816, a Private Land
Claims Committee; in 1825, a Revolutionary Pensions Committee; and
in 1831, an Invalid Pensions Committee.' 5' Similar development occurred
in the Senate.'5 2 By 1832, half of Congress' time was consumed with
such private business-Fridays and Saturdays being fully set aside for
such purposes. 5 3
Second, Congress delegated claims-determination authority only to
non-judicial bodies or to the Treasury or other departments where it
could retain effective control over both the decision-making body and
appropriations.' 5 4 Thus, during this period two general but separate
claims systems were functioning-the congressional committee system
and the Treasury Department system.' The Treasury Department con-
sidered the bulk of routine contract claims, while Congress tended to
144. Id.
145. Wiecek, supra note 78, at 390.
146. See Binney, Origin and Development of Legal Recourse Against the Government
in the United States, 57 U. Pa. L. Rev. 372, 381 (1909).
147. 4 Annals of Cong. 883 (1849).
148. H.R. Rep. No. 730, supra note 98, at 2-3.
149. Id. at 3.
150. See 2 W. Cowen, P. Nichols & M. Bennett, supra note 88, at 6.
151. H.R. Rep., supra note 98, at 3.
152. See 2 W. Cowen, P. Nichols & M. Bennett, supra note 88, at 8.
153. 8 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams 479 (C. Adams ed. 1874-1877) [hereinafter
cited as J.Q. Adams Memoirs].
154. Wiecek, supra note 78, at 390.
155. Id. at 393.
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handle "appeals" from Treasury determinations 56 or non-contract claims
not susceptible to the narrow requirements of the Treasury auditors.'
After the War of 1812, Congress appointed a special commissioner to
hear and decide numerous claims arising out of that conflict;' however,
the commissioner was subject to the effective control of Congress and
was not truly independent. 5 9 Congress delegated no claims adjudication
authority to the federal courts.
The role of the federal judiciary during this period was limited and
characterized by a painful silence. The repudiation of the Supreme
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia by the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment did not technically resolve the question left open by the
Court: whether the Constitution itself granted the federal courts juris-
diction to decide claims against the United States. 160 The Eleventh
Amendment merely addressed the question of suits against the states; 6'
it did not necessarily adopt Justice Iredell's dissenting view that since
in England the king could not be sued without his consent, in America
such authority to consent was lodged in the legislature by analogy.
62
However, the Supreme Court appears to have "learned its lesson'
63
from the 1798 amendment repudiating its decision. In 1803, in the famous
case of Marbury v. Madison,'64 the Supreme Court tread more carefully
156. Binney, supra note 146, at 378 ("As soon as the Treasury Department was
established, the accounting officers were daily occupied in paying what the government
owed for contracts of all kinds; but if those officers refused or cut down a claim, further
relief could only be had from Congress itself.").
157. H.R. Rep., supra note 98, at 7-8 ("When claims depend on certain principles,
recognized by the accounting officers, and are sustained by such evidence and vouchers
as have been required by established rules, they are settled with as much promptitude in
the Departments as could be expected; but there are very many cases where the accounting
officers are prevented, by the strictness of the principles on which they act, and by the
rules which govern them from doing justice to a claimant.").
158. See Act of April 9, 1816, ch. 40, 3 Stat. 261; Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 110,
3 Stat. 397 (1846).
159. Although the judicial status of the Commission was debated at the time, William
M. Wiecek has observed that "from our twentieth century vantage, it is plain that the
Commissioner was merely an employee of Congress, having no more judicial status than
a congressional committee." Wiecek, supra note 78, at 390-91.
160. Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides, in part, that "[t]he judicial power
shall extend .. .to controversies to which the United States shall be a party." See supra
text accompanying notes 116-18.
161. See U.S. Const. amend. XI, quoted supra note 135.
162. R. Watkins, supra note 140, at 53-54. Nevertheless, nearly a century later, the
Supreme Court was to interpret the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment as a ratification
of Justice Iredell's views. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1889).
163. Id. at 54.
164. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). This case is, of course, famous for extablishing
the concept of judicial review of the constitutionality of acts of Congress. See, e.g., Van
Alstyne, A Critical Guide To Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. 1 (1969); Burton,
The Cornerstone of Constitutional Law: The Extraordinary Case of Marbury v. Madison,
36 A.B.A.J. 805 (1950).
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than it did in Chisholm. While reiterating its position that the United
States was "a government of laws, and not of men" and that "[it will
• . . cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy
for the violation of a vested legal right,"' 65 the Court sought to avoid
a direct confrontation with the Executive branch of government. 166 In-
stead, it declared unconstitutional a statute which purported to give it
original jurisdiction in mandamus cases against the government and held
that it could not order the Secretary of State to deliver a certificate of
appointment to a judge. During this period, the Supreme Court appeared
to accept grudgingly the "legislative model" as a political fact 67 but
refused to dignify it with any theoretical or policy justification. For
example, in Cohens v. Virginia 68 in 1821, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged for the first time its inability to determine claims against the
United States by simply stating, as though the matter was already
decided, that "[tihe universally received opinion is that no suit can be
commenced or prosecuted against the United States.' ' 69 Similarly, in
Emerson v. Hall, T0 the Supreme Court acknowledged the power of
Congress to enact, in 1831, a private statute providing for the payment
of money directly to the heirs of a claimant without any attempt to
explain the constitutional basis for such congressional power.' 7' This
judicial silence-particularly in light of its earlier statements in Hayburn's
Case and Chisholm-clearly underscores the fact that the "legislative
model" was more an extension of colonial history than a deduction of
logic from the new Constitution. Moreover, the uniform utilization of
165. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
166. At the time Marbury v. Madison was decided, the case was popularly viewed as
a determination by the Supreme Court not to interfere with the power of the Executive.
1 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 232 (rev. ed. 1926).
167. The institutional strength of the judiciary relative to the other branches of gov-
ernment was considerably less during this early period than in later years. The adoption
of the Eleventh Amendment in 1798 after Chisolm v. Georgia, the nearly successful
impeachment conviction in 1805 of Justice Chase, see Burton, supra note 164, at 883,
and the refusal of President Jackson to enforce a decision of the Supreme Court in the
Cherokee Cases in 1831-1833, see 1 C. Warren, supra note 166, at 729-79, amply dem-
onstrated the power of the states, Congress., and the Executive, respectively, to challenge
the authority of the federal judiciary during this period.
168. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
169. Id. at 411-12. This comment was dicta in Cohens v. Virginia. The concept of
the non-suability of the federal government was first applied in United States v. McLemore,
45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 287-88 (1846), again without comment or explanation. It was not
until after the Civil War that the elaborate doctrine of "sovereign immunity" was affirmed
by the courts. See Briggs v. Light-Boats, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 157, 166-176 (1865); United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 196, 204-08 1 S. Ct. 240, 246-250 (1882).
170. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 352 (1839).
171. It is not until 1895 that the Supreme Court explained the constitutional basis for
this congressional power. See United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440-41 (1895).
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the "legislative model" by the states during this period tends to confirm
this view. 172
During the latter part of this period, however, the federal courts
did assert a limited role. In Kendall v. United States, 73 the Supreme
Court considered an 1836 private act which certain claimant mail con-
tractors had procured from Congress. The act required the postmaster
general to credit the claimants with whatever sum the solicitor of the
treasury should decide was due with regard to a claim involving the
carrying of mail. 74 The solicitor found for the claimants in the amount
of $161,563.89.'17 Pursuant to orders from the President, the postmaster
general refused to credit the total amount, 76 and the federal circuit
court of the District of Columbia issued a writ of mandamus to the
postmaster general to recognize the credits. 177 The Supreme Court mi-
raculously found that the federal circuit court had authority to issue a
writ of mandamus,78 artfully aligned itself with Congress (which wanted
to pay) against the Executive (which did not), 7 9 and gallantly recognized
that once Congress had consented to payment8 0 it was the responsibility
172. See, e.g., Divine v. Harvie, 23 Ky. (7 T.B. Mon.) 439 (1828); Sewall v. Lee, 9
Mass. (9 Tyng) 363, 369 (1812); Williams v. The Register, 3 Tenn. (1 Cooke) 213 (1812);
Commonwealth v. The Heirs of Andre, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 224, 225 (1825); Black v.
Rempublicam, I Yeates 139, 142 (Pa. 1792); and Commonwealth v. Colquehouns, 12 Va.
(2 Hen. & M) 213, 233 (1808). However, in 1833 Mississippi appears to have been the
first state to adopt a fairly general policy of permitting claims against its state to be
filed in its courts. See Farish v. The State, 2 Miss. (2 Howard) 826 (1838); Davie, Suing
the State, 18 Am. L. Rev. 814, 827 (1884).
173. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
174. Id. at 608-609.
175. Id. at 609.
176. Id. at 612.
177. Id. at 608.
178. Id. at 614-24. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), the Supreme
Court, as discussed previously, held that its original jurisdiction was fixed by the Con-
stitution and therefore Congress could not expand it by conferring upon it original
jurisdiction to issue mandamus against the government. In Mclntire v. Wood, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 504 (1813), and McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821), the
Supreme Court held that Congress had not conferred the authority to issue mandamus
on the federal circuit courts sitting in the several states. By a long and complicated line
of reasoning, however, the Supreme Court was able to find that authority to issue
mandamus survived in the District of Columbia.
179. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 613 ("To contend that the obligation imposed on the President
to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel
construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible."). In Marbury v. Madison,
the Supreme Court, after asserting its right to control executive action, avoided the issue
by finding it had no power to issue mandamus against the government. In Kendall,
however, it was able to align itself with the interests of Congress, 'and found both the
authority (and the courage) to issue a writ of mandamus against the Executive. See Lee,
The Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Action, 36 Geo. L.J. 287, 292-93
(1948).
180. Id. at 611.
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of the courts to see that the Executive performed its ministerial duty
to do so. 8 ' The role of the federal judiciary, therefore, was limited to
enforcing the decisions of Congress with respect to claims.' The period
of 1794-1838 constituted the heyday of the "legislative model" of claims
adjudication. 8 3 While there were isolated attempts at change,8 s4 this was
a period of general acceptance of this procedure and there was no
widespread agitation for reform.8 5 Toward the end of this period, how-
ever, there were signs that dissatisfaction was privately brewing.8 6
C. Decline-Inundation Of Congress By Claims
1. Dissatisfaction (1838-1855)
In 1838, this dissatisfaction reached the point where the House of
Representatives instructed its Committee of Claims to inquire into this
matter. The Committee's report,""7 in summary, found that: (1) the
congressional system of claims determination was breaking down under
the flood of claims being filed;'88 (2) the volume of petitions presented
had increased six times over the volume presented to the first Con-
gresses; 189 (3) Congress was not able to consider, let alone dispose of,
181. Id. at 614.
182. In Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272 (1850), the Supreme Court clarified
its decision in Kendall v. United States by indicating that a claim could be paid only if
Congress had provided a specific appropriation for it. "[W]ithout . .. an appropriation
[a claim] cannot and should not be paid by the Treasury, whether the claim is by a
verdict or judgment, or without either, and no mandamus or other remedy lies against
any officer of the Treasury Department." Id. at 290-91.
183. See Wiecek, supra note 78, at 391-92.
184. In 1824, for example, the Senate considered and rejected a bill which would have
permitted, with some limitations, claimants to bring actions against the United States in
the federal district or circuit courts. 41 Annals of Cong. 472-74, 476-80, 570 (1856).
185. Wiecek, supra note 78, at 392.
186. In 1832, John Quincy Adams, then a member of the House of Representatives,
wrote the following in his diary:
There ought to be no private business before Congress. There is a great defect
in our institutions by the want of a Court of Exchequer or Chamber of Accounts.
It is judicial business, and legislative assemblies ought to have nothing to do
with it. One-half of the time of Congress is consumed by it, and there is no
common rule of justice for any two of the cases decided. A deliberative assembly
is the worst of all tribunals for the administration of justice.
8 J.Q. Adams Memoirs, supra note 153, at 480.
187. See generally H.R. Rep., supra note 98.
188. Id. at I ("That the accumulation of private claims has been so great, within a
few years past, as to burden several of the committees of Congress, and to retard final
action on a great proportion of the private claims, artd on many important subjects of
a public character.").
189. While a total of 2,317 public and private petitions were presented to the first
three Congresses (1789-1795), the number had increased to 14,602 in the three Congresses
(1832-1837) immediately preceding the report. See id. at 4.
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a vast percentage of these petitions; 9 ° (4) as a result of these problems,
great injustice was done to many claimants' and the valuable time of
Congress was being consumed in resolving private claims rather than
the great public issues facing the country. 92 The Committee recom-
mended the establishment of a board of commissioners' 93 to remedy the
situation. However, the perceptive warning of the Claims Committee
was to go unheeded by Congress which attempted to lumber on as
before.
By 1848, the dissatisfaction had turned to crisis. For the first time,
the legitimacy of the "legislative model" came under widespread political
attack. While in 1838 the system was criticized as "expensive as well
as dilatory,"'' 94 by 1848 the Committee on Claims, in a new report,' 95
described the system as plagued with "evils,"' 96 "of unparalleled in-
justice, and wholly discreditable to any civilized nation."' 97 The 1848
report summarized the ten year period since its previous report as follows:
"[Dluring the ten years . . ., out of 16,573 petitions of private claimants
to the House of Representatives, and 3,436 bills reported, only 1,796
passed the House, and but 910 passed both Houses.' ' 9 8 In other words,
only one out of every eighteen claimants was successful! Obviously,
many meritorious claims were not being redressed under this system. 99
Moreover, the report admitted that while many just claims were not
paid, many unjust claims were.2°° Thus, the report criticized the manner
in which testimony was taken ex parte before committees with no rep-
190. Of the 8,655 private petitions presented to the three Congresses between 1832
and 1837, 5,353 were acted on and 3,302 were not. Of those acted on, 1,683 resulted in
private bills being introduced of which only 603 passed both the House and Senate. See
id. at 4-5.
191. Id. at 8 ("The liquidation of claims by Congress is expensive as well as dilatory.
Instances are not unfrequent where thousands of dollars have been expended in discussing
a claim of small amount. Claimants and agents persevere in renewing their applications,
year after year, until the loss of time and expenses absorb the entire amount of a small
claim; and if it is not favorably considered, the claimant is made a debtor to an amount
that embarrasses him for years.") .
192. Id. at I ("[Miembers elected to participate in the examination and discussion of
national subjects have devoted their time in the adjustment of private claims, and when
called to vote on questions involving the national policy, interest, security, or honor, they
have been obliged, in a great measure, to rely on the reports of committees, and on
debates, to guide them in their decisions, without an opportunity being afforded to
investigate for themselves.")
193. Id. at 9.
194. Id. at 8.
195. H.R. Rep. No. 498, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. (1848).
196. Id. at 1.
197. Id. at 2.
198. Id. at 4.
199. Id.
200. Id. ("The objection is often made . . . that Congress is often imposed upon,
and that unjust claims, to a large amount, are passed annually through Congress. This
is doubtless true, and, from the present course of proceding, is quite unavoidable.") .
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resentative from the government present to rebut or cross-examine the
claimant's case.20 It also revealed the practice of many unsuccessful
claimants who received adverse recommendations simply to resubmit
their claims again and, again to different committees and to succeeding
Congresses. 22 Finally, the report questioned whether or not Congress-
as a multimember political institution-was a proper forum for the
impartial adjudication of individual claims against the United States. 20 3
Despite this severe criticism, the Committee was not prepared to abandon
the essence of the "legislative model," i.e., final congressional control.
Accordingly, the Committee rejected proposals to delegate the deter-
mination of claims to the federal courts20 4 or to a board whose decisions
would be final.2 5 Instead, the Committee recommended the establishment
of a permanent, three member board which would sit in Washington,
D.C., examine claims, and submit its recommendations to Congress.20 6
Although gaining significant support, opponents were able to prevent
its passage 07 by characterizing it as "a base abandonment by the rep-
resentatives of the people of the curatorship of the treasury of the
United States to a few commissioners."2 8 This rejection, however, did
not solve the problem.
Between 1849 and 1855, nine different bills were introduced to relieve
Congress of the inundation of claims. 20 9 By 1852, the crisis was turning
to scandal as the Senate was forced to create a special committee "to
inquire into abuses, bribery, or fraud, in the prosecution of claims
before Congress. '2 °1 0 After an attempt at major internal reform of the
House claims processing system failed to gain sufficient support, 2 ' a
201. Id. at 6.
202. Id. at 6.
203. Id. at 5 ("These grievances are so serious and so obvious that the committee
forbear to refer to those which arise almost necessarily out of the character of the tribunal
itself. The very constitution of the tribunal is entirely inconsistent with the proper discharge
of such duties, even if they had ample time to devote to them. Each House is constituted
as a court of justice, with a necessary appeal to and decision by the other House in all
cases. The bodies making the decision are too numerous for any such duties. They are,
in some sense, judges in their own cases. It being impossible that members can thoroughly
examine one claim out of twenty brought before Congress, it is entirely out of their
power to act upon the claims fairly or understandingly.")
204. Id. at 8.
205. Id. at 7 ("The main objection urged against these various plans has been, that
in relation to claims of a certain limited amount, the decision of the board of commissioners
was declared to be final as against the government, and provision was made for the
payment of the award of the commissioners, without reference to Congress.")
206. Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 140 (1849).
207. See id. at 139-42, 163-72, 198-99, 303-09, 378-80.
208. Id. at 168.
209. Wiecek, supra note 78, at 395.
210. Cong. Globe, 32d Cong., Ist Sess. 2100 (1852).
211. See Cong. Globe, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 96-104 (1853).
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consensus appeared to form that removal of this function from the halls
of Congress was the only solution. 2 The question was to where?
2. Advisory Court (1855-1860)
During December 1854, the Senate addressed this question and con-
sidered delegating this task to (1) the Treasury Department, (2) the
federal courts, or (3) a board advisory to Congress.213 Given its existing
role over routine contract claims, complete transfer to the Treasury
Department was quickly dismissed as a "dangerous experiment. ' 2 4 Hence,
the basic debate focused on court delegation versus board delegation.
The court advocates, led by Senator Pettit, argued that the government,
no less than any individual citizen, ought to be accountable for its
liabilities before a court of law and that nothing less than transferring
the entire matter to the courts-the decisions of which would be final-.
would reduce the backlog of claims accumulating before Congress.2 15
Advisory decisions by a board, warned Senator Pettit, would only pro-
long the process and "nothing will be gained. '21 6 The board advocates,
led by Senator Brodhead, could not accept such a radical departure
from the "legislative model." After cautioning that the decisions of the
courts would "of course, . . . have to be final and conclusive, ' 21 7
Senator Brodhead argued that such an approach "would be placing the
public Treasury at the disposal of the courts contrary to the meaning
of the Constitution and sound policy." 218 Instead, he proposed the
establishment of a three member "Board of Claims" which would
function as "an examining magistrate" for Congress and advise it on
the appropriate disposition of claims.2 9 Unlike the court advocates, the
Brodhead approach sought to refine, but not reject, the "legislative
model."
212. See Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1855).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 72-73.
216. Id. at 73.
217. Id. at 70: In making this remark, Senator Brodhead is presumably referring to
the principle established in Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
218. Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1855). Apparently, many persons shared
Senator Brodhead's view that delegation of final jurisdiction over claims to the courts
was inconsistent with Congress's appropriation power contained in Article I, section 9 of
the Constitution. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1853).
219. Conceptually, Senator Brodhead envisaged his proposed board to be more in-
quisitional than adjudicatory in .nature. He rejected the proposal that a solicitor was
necessary to represent the government on the grounds that "each member of the board
represents the Government, and is in some measure an. examining magistrate." Cong.
Globe, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1855). This .approach was criticized by Senator Clayton
who wanted the board members "tobe impartial arbiters and judges between the United
States and the individual claimant, feeling themselves as much bound to look to the
interest of thefclaimant as to the interest of the Government." Id. at 72.
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In the end, the Senate agreed on a compromise measure first sug-
gested by Senator Hunter. 2 0 Under this compromise, a tribunal called
the "Court of Claims" would be established to hear claims against the
United States. 22' Three "judges" would sit on the tribunal and serve
during good behavior. 22 The proceedings would be adjudicatory in nature
with the government represented by a special solicitor. 223 The Court of
Claims would report its decisions, accompanied by the records and
suggested implementing legislation, to Congress, where the decisions would
pend "until the same shall be finally acted upon. ' 224 Whether or not
such a tribunal was truly a "court" or still a "board" was hotly
debated; 221 nevertheless, its superficial ability to reconcile the court and
board approaches within the context of the "legislative model" made
it politically irresistible. In the words of Senator Cass, "[t]his plan
proposes that the board, or court, shall investigate the claims presented,
leaving to Congress final action upon them, so that the Treasury will
be within our control. '226 With the concurrence of the House, 227 this
ambiguous compromise became law in early 1855.228
For its part, the new Court of Claims quickly declared it was not
an advisory body but a court of law that "can only adjudge, and that
whether its jurisdiction be final or not. ' 2 9 In 1856, the first decisions
of the Court of Claims were reported to Congress. 2 0 Obviously, the
success of the new tribunal depended entirely on the deference Congress
paid to its decisions. Were the decisions to be treated as final judgments
or advisory recommendations? The appropriate scope of congressional
review was debated in the House in the context of deciding whether to
refer the decisions directly to the entire House sitting as a Committee
220. See id. at 71.
221. Id. at 105-06.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612, 614 (1855).
225. See Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. 106-14 (1855). A dispute arose over whether
or not the "judges" should serve for a fixed term or during good behavior. Advocates
for a fixed term argued that since the tribunal's decisions lacked finality and were subject
to final action by Congress, the decisions of the Court of Claims, despite its name, was
not a court in the constitutional sense and life tenure was not required. See, e.g., id. at
107, 110-11 (remarks of Sen. Weller). Advocates for life tenure, on the other hand, argued
that the test for a judicial tribunal could not be enforcibility because there "can be no
judicial tribunal which could issue an execution to satisfy a judgment out of the Treasury
of the United States, so that test in this instance must fail." See id. at 113 (remarks of
Sen. Stuart).
226. Id. at 106.
227. Id. at 891.
228. See supra note 224.
229. Todd v. United States, I Cong. Ct. C1. 1, 6 (1855); Cong. Globe, 34th Cong.,
1st Sess. 972 (1856).
230. Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 607 (1856).
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of the Whole (in which case the review would be necessarily pro forma)
or whether to refer the decisions to the traditional committees which
handled such claims (in which case the review would be likely de novo).23'
By a vote of 78 to 62, the House defeated a motion to refer the decisions
directly to the Committee of the Whole House. 2 2 In so doing, the House
effectively treated the decisions as advisory and subject to reconsideration
and revision in the various committees.
This decision nullified the effectiveness of the Court of Claims and
returned Congress to the same role it had tried to shed. 233 Predictably,
all the old problems reappeared.23 4 Between 1855 and 1860, the Court
of Claims rendered judgments totaling $529,000.235 By 1860, Congress
had only paid approximately half such amount. 23 6 This created bitter
disappointment among successful litigants237 and many attorneys consid-
ered it no advantage to even submit a claim to such tribunal. 2 s The
"last ditch" attempt to save the "legislative model" through creation
of an advisory court had failed. With the outbreak of the Civil War
in 1860 and the avalanche of claims that followed, Congress, at long
last, was prepared to do the unthinkable: seek assistance from the
courts.
23 9
II. THE "HYBRID MODEL"-CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II
Congress and the federal judiciary shared the responsibility for de-
termining claims against the United States from the Civil War until
World War II. During this period, Congress continued to consider claims
such as tort and moral claims while gradually authorizing other categories
of claims (such as contract and "taking" claims) to be determined by
a revised Court of Claims or, in limited instances, the regular federal
courts. This transitional arrangement came to be explained by the legal
doctrine of sovereign immunity, i.e., the United States could only be
sued as provided for by Congress. During the height of this period, an
uneasy compromise was reached whereby the Supreme Court reviewed
the judgments of the Court of Claims as though part of the federal
judiciary and Congress paid such judgments without compulsion. The
231. Id. at 607-10, 970-72, 1241-43.
232. Id. at 1245.
233. Id. at 1247.
234. Wiecek, supra note 78, at 397-98.
235. Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 984 (1860).
236. Id.
237. See id. at 987.
238. Submitting a claim to the Court of Claims appeared to be a "no win" situation
for the claimant. If the claimant was successful, Congress gave the decision little weight
and reheard the matter again. However, if the claimant lost, Congress tended to treat
the claim as dead. See Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 303 (1863).
239. See Wiecek, supra note 78, at 398.
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"legislative model" of payment, therefore, was not immediately replaced
by a "judicial model" in which all claims were finally determined and
enforceable through the regular federal court structure. This "hybrid
model," however, started to break down after World War I. This section
of the article traces: (A) the development of the "hybrid model" during
the Civil War when Congress sought the assistance of the Supreme Court
in making the decisions of the Court of Claims final; (B) the triumph
of the "hybrid model" in the post-Civil War era as the Supreme Court
and Congress reached an uneasy compromise over the issue of enforce-
ability and allocation of claims responsibility under the banner of sov-
ereign immunity; and (C) the decline of the "hybrid model" commencing
with the World War I period as the sovereign immunity doctrine lost
credibility and the uneasy compromise over enforcibility broke down.
A. Development-Congress Seeks Court Assistance
1. Congressional Request (1860-1863)
By 1860, a congressional report recognized the need for assistance
from the federal judiciary. 240 The basic choice was whether to confer
claims determination authority on the existing federal courts or to re-
organize the Court of Claims so as to make its decisions final, subject
to review by the Supreme Court.241 Although proposed,2 42 there was little
support for the idea of exposing the government to suit all over the
country in the various federal courts. 243 Instead, support grew, partic-
ularly in the Senate, for making the decisions of the Court of Claims
final. 244 One Senate argument in favor of retaining claims in one special
court was that Congress could simply abolish it if it became dissatisfied
with its performance. 245 The House, however, was not to be hurried. 246
240. See H.R. Rep. No. 513, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. (1860).
241. Id. at 4.
242. Id. at 7. See also Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 989-91 (1860) (remarks of
Sen. Harlan).
243. This concern was colorfully expressed by Senator Crittenden who stated that "if
you allow men to sue the Government of the United States everywhere, she will have to
have a band of itinerant lawyers traveling all around and everywhere looking out for and
watching after her interests; and they could not be protected; it would be impossible."
Id. at 991.
244. See id. at 982-91, 1120-29.
245. Senator Fessenden made the argument for having the judgments of the Court of
Claims be final as follows:
I see no particular difficulty about it, because the court itself is in our power,
and if we find, at any time, that it is going beyond the limits of what we think
to be right, is becoming, as we may imagine, corrupt, deciding cases upon bad
principles, we can strike it out of existence at any moment we please.
Id. at 987.
246. See id. at 2171.
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In 1861 President Lincoln, in his annual message to Congress, 247
noted the Civil War and the resulting increase in the number of claims.
He bluntly told Congress it was time for major reform. In a direct
assault on the "legislative model," Lincoln said:
It is as much the duty of Government to render prompt justice
against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same
between private individuals. The investigation and adjudication
of claims, in their nature belong to the judicial department;
besides, it is apparent that the attention of Congress will be
more than usually engaged, for some time to come, with great
national questions. 248
Lincoln urged Congress to make the judgments of the Court of Claims
final, subject to the right of appeal to the Supreme Court.
During 1862 and 1863, Congress debated a bill which contained Lin-
coln's recommendation. 249 It was well understood that the finality pro-
vision constituted a fundamental deviation from the "legislative model."
One opponent of the bill, Congressman Diven of New York, called it
"a most radical change ' 250 and a surrender of congressional control
over the treasury to the courts. 25' Senator Doolittle of Wisconsin, another
opponent, went even further, arguing that final congressional discretion
over claims "is a discretion which we cannot transfer constitutionally
to any other body . . . . It is a discretion which the Constitution puts
upon us; and we must exercise that discretion, and determine whether
or not the appropriation is just. 25 2 Most members of Congress, however,
shared the view of Senator Trumbull of Illinois that the advisory Court
of Claims "was a failure" and that Congress should either make its
decisions final "or else dispense with the court." '253 Nevertheless, in an
apparent effort to build a bare majority in the Senate to retain the
finality provision, 25 4 Senator Trumbull agreed to limit the Court of
Claims to its existing jurisdiction, i.e., principally to contract claims. 5
247. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 1-4 (1862). Lincoln's words are engraved
on the Court of Claims Building in Washington. 2 W. Cohen, P. Nichols & M. Bennett,
supra note 88, at 21.
248. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 2 (1862).
249. Id. at 1671-77; Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 303-13, 394-401, 415-27, 1541
(1863).
250. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1671 (1862).
251. Id. at 1672.
252. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 312 (1863).
253. Id. at 303.
254. In the Senate, a motion to delete the finality provision on January 14, 1863,
failed only after the Vice-President broke a 20 to 20 tie by voting in the negative. Id.
at 311.
255. Senator Trumbull, a proponent of the bill, stated:
As we propose to amend the [House] bill, the jurisdiction of the court is
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The willingness of Congress to accord finality to the judgments of
the Court of Claims, however, did not mean that it was willing to
authorize judicial enforcement of such judgments. 2 6 Despite the argument
by Congressman Pendleton of Ohio that the bill should provide for the
levying of government property if a judgment was not paid, 257 this
suggestion fell on ears understandably deafened by the sounds of Civil
War.258
Ironically, the lack of judicial enforceability created another argument
for the opponents of the bill. Congressman Diven questioned whether
the lack of enforceability prevented the Supreme Court from hearing
appeals at all from the Court of Claims. In an obvious reference to
Hayburn's Case, he asked whether the Supreme Court itself had not
refused jurisdiction in previous cases involving claims when it could not
execute its own decree. 2 9 Congressman Bingham reassured his colleagues
that once a judgment was rendered, it would be paid by Congress "as
a matter of course," and therefore enforceability was no problem.2 6
Under the bill, final judgments were to be paid automatically by the
Secretary of the Treasury "out of any general appropriation made by
law for the payment and satisfaction of private claims." '2 6' This was
generally understood at the time to mean that Congress, in advance of
each fiscal year, would appropriate a fixed lump sum out of which all
judgments rendered subsequently during such fiscal year would be paid
confined to cases arising out of contract with the Government. The bill, as it
passed the other House, is a little larger; it gives the court jurisdiction of all
claims for which the Government would be liable in law or equity, if it were
suable in a court of justice; but the bill, as the committee report it here,
proposes to leave the jurisdiction as it is in the old law.
Id. at 304-05. The "old law" also contained jurisdiction over claims founded upon federal
statute or regulation. See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855).
256. The 1862 debates indicate that Congress was well aware of the case of Reeside
v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272 (1850), which held that a claim, even if reduced to
judgment, could only be paid if Congress had provided a specific appropriation for it.
See Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1674 (1862).
257. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1675-77 (1862).
258. Id. at 1676 (Rep. Wright: "Let me ask the gentleman from Ohio a question.
Would he expose the military property of the Government to sale and execution? Does
his amendment contemplate the seizure and sale of the artillery and other munitions of
war of the Government to satisfy the claims of claimants, and thus leave the Government
defenseless?").
259. Id. at 1673 ("But, sir, I doubt, and if I understand the language of the Supreme
Court, the, doubt, whether they have jurisdiction in any such cases. I understand the
Supreme Court of the United States to have decided, in two or three cases, that they
had no jurisdiction of any case where they could not execute their own decree; that a
part of the province of the court is, to first determine what is right, then decree that
right, and then issue their process for the execution of their decree."). Congressman Diven
was no doubt referring to Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
260. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1676 (1862).
261. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 398 (1863).
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automatically. 262 This, argued proponents, would rid Congress of revi-
sionary power over individual claims while retaining in Congress general
budgetary control over the Treasury. 263 In the Senate, this issue was
extensively debated when opponents to the bill unsuccessfully attempted
to amend this provision to require payment to be made only out of
specific appropriations made after the rendition of each judgment.2 64
Correctly perceiving this to be another attempt to preserve revisionary
control in Congress, the bill's Senate proponents defeated this amend-
ment by a 20 to 16 vote. 265
Thinking they had won the battle, the Senate proponents let down
their guard the next day. Just before the final vote, they agreed to the
following ambiguously worded amendment: "no money shall be paid
. . . for any claim . . . till after an appropriation therefor shall be
estimated for by the Secretary of the Treasury. ' 266 Assured that this
did not require specific appropriations for claims, and apparently be-
lieving it merely meant that the general appropriation for anticipated
claims was to be based on an estimate made by the Secretary of Treasury,
the proponents did not object to the amendment. 267 This provision
became section 14 of the final version of the bill which became effective
on March 3, 1863.268
Obviously, the 1863 amendments did not completely abolish the "leg-
islative model" of claims adjudication. Congress gave up control over
contract and certain federal claims but still retained jurisdiction over
tort and all other categories of claims. Moreover, Congress did not
create a pure "judicial model" of payment with regard to the limited
jurisdiction that it did relinquish. Rather than conferring such jurisdiction
on the existing federal courts with full authority to decide and enforce
their decisions, Congress conferred such authority on a special Court
of Claims with authority to decide, subject to Supreme Court review,
but not to enforce its decisions. Congress merely pledged that it would
annually appropriate a general amount out of which all judgments would
be paid. Although defenders of the "legislative model" clearly recognized
262. In the Senate, this concept was clearly understood. Id. In the House, however,
whether or not the general appropriation for all claims was to be made before or after
specific judgments were rendered was less clear. E.g., Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess.
1676 (1862).
263. See Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 304 (1863) (Sen. Trumbull: "Still, the
Treasury would not be laid open to outsiders, as the Senator suggests. It is not proposed
to bring a specific bill into Congress for each claim; but still Congress will make ap-
propriations to pay the claims or not, as it pleases. The Treasury will still be under the
control of Congress.").
264. Id. at 398-400.
265. Id. at 400.
266. Id. at 426.
267. See id.
268. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765, 768 (1863).
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this as the end of an era,2 69 it was still not clear whether the Supreme
Court was willing to accept this "hybrid model" as the beginning of
another. Nevertheless, the request to the Supreme Court had been made.
2. Judicial Rejection (1864-1865)
On June 25, 1864, Congress made good on its pledge to give up
revisionary control by appropriating a lump sum of $300,000 "[flor
payments of judgments to be rendered by [the] court of claims." (Em-
phasis added)2 0 Despite this fact, the Supreme Court on March 10,
1865, in the case of Gordon v. United States,271 dismissed the first appeal
from the Court of Claims "for want of jurisdiction" without a formal
opinion. The court reporter's note summarizing the decision cryptically
stated that a majority of the court felt that "under the Constitution,
no appellate jurisdiction over the Court of Claims could be exercised"
and that since the term was at its close "the reasons . . .might be
announced hereafter. 2 72 The Supreme Court's rejection of appellate
jurisdiction came as a great surprise. 273 Obviously, the reasons that were
to be "announced hereafter" would be of great importance to the future
of Congress' great experiment: the "hybrid" Court of Claims. At this
critical juncture, one of the more bizarre happenings in American legal
history occurred. Two opinions explaining the Court's decision in Gordon
v. United States came into existence: one by Chief Justice Taney and
another by his successor, Chief Justice Chase.
thief Justice Taney prepared a draft opinion which he gave to the
clerk before his death on October 12, 1864. This opinion was subse-
quently lost or misplaced. 274 Taney's "lost opinion" would be recovered
and published by the court in 1885-twenty-one years after his death.2 75
269. Senator Hale of New Hampshire, a staunch defender of the "legislative model"
to the very end, summarized his feelings:
I think, sir, when some future Gibbon shall write the history of the decline
and fall of the great Republic, and shall give the indications which marked its
progress to decay, one of them will be that about the year of grace 1863 the
Thirty-Seventh Congress took it into their head that they were wiser than
everybody that went before them, and departed from all the precedents estab-
lished by their fathers, and started out on new, untried, and extravagant theories
and notions. Sir, from the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution to
this time, the Congress of the United States have been jealous upon this subject.
They would never allow a dollar to be taken out of the Treasury on a verdict
of twelve men, and a judgment of law that the verdict should stand.
Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 310 (1863).
270. Act of June 25, 1864, ch. 147, 13 Stat. 145, 148 (1864).
271. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864).
272. Id.
273. Wiecek, supra note 78, at 401.
274. See United States V. Jones, 119 U.S. 477, 478, 7 S. Ct. 283, 284 (1886).
275. See Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1885, decided 1864). Whether the
Gordon opinion by Taney or the Chase opinion, Gordon's Case, 7 Ct. Cl. 1 (1871),
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In the meanwhile, Salmon P. Chase had become the new Chief Justice.
He issued a formal version of the court's 1865 dismissal in Gordon v.
United States.17 6 The Chase opinion contained the following brief ex-
planation:
We think that the authority given to the head of an executive
department, by necessary implication, in the fourteenth section
of the amended Court of Claims act, to revise all the decisions
of this court requiring payment of money, denies to it the judicial
power from the exercise of which appeals can be taken to this
court.
2 77
There was no mention of Taney's "lost opinion." However, the Chase
opinion closed by ambiguously stating that "[tihe reasons which neces-
sitate this conclusion may be more fully announced hereafter.12 7 Thus,
when Congress met in 1866 to consider rectifying amendments, it only
had the Chase opinion before it.27 9
B. Triumph-Congress and Court Reach Uneasy Accommodation
1. Accommodation on Payment and Non-Enforceability
In 1866 Congress considered amendments to cure the problem sug-
gested in Gordon v. United States. Given the Chase opinion, the pro-
posed solution was simply to repeal section 14 of the Court of Claims
Act, which prohibited the payment of judgments until estimated for by
the Secretary of the Treasury. Senator Trumbull of Illinois argued that
this repeal would remove any concern that the executive branch retained
revisionary power over court judgments and would satisfy the sole
objection identified by Chief Justice Chase.2 0 Nevertheless, Senator Davis
of Kentucky did not feel mere repeal of section 14 went far enough to
should be regarded as the "correct" explanation of the Supreme Court's decision in
Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864), has been a matter of dispute
ever since. Compare Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 563-64, 53 S. Ct. 751, 753-
54 (1933) with Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 568-69, 82 S. Ct. 1459, 1482-83
(1962).
276. The Chase opinion has never been published by the Supreme Court in its official
reports. See United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. at 478, 7 S. Ct. at 283. It can be found,
however, in the official reports of the Court of Claims. See Gordon's Case, 7 Ct. Cl.
1 (1871).
277. Gordon's Case, 7 Ct. Cl. at 2. In United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. at 478, 7
S. Ct. at 283, Chief Justice Waite questioned the precision of the court reporter's summary
found in Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) at 561, because it did not allude
to this paragraph.
278. Id.
279. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 770-71 (1866).
280. Id.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
cure the basic problem: the courts' inability to make the government
pay its judgments like any other losing party. Advocating a "judicial
model" of enforcement, he proposed a statute which would require
payment out of any existing funds and, if no funds were available,
authorize the claimant to execute on government property as against
any other judgment debtor z. 2 '
Given the Chase opinion, Congress apparently concluded that the
Supreme Court would not insist on enforceability so long as Congress
continued to appropriate sufficient funds to assure the payment of all
judgments. Therefore, Congress ignored Senator Davis's proposal ,282
repealed section 14 effective March 20, 1866,283 and appropriated an
additional $500,000 for the payment of judgments on June 23, 1866.284
Congress guessed correctly-the Supreme Court promptly issued regu-
lations prescribing the manner in which appeals could be taken from
the Court of Claims. 28 In the December Term, 1866, the Supreme Court
heard its first appeal under the new regulations in the case of De Groot
v. United States.286
Between 1866 and 1870, Congress continued to appropriate annually,
in advance, lump sum amounts "[flor payment of judgments'which may
be rendered by the court in favor of claimants. 2 87 This congressional
conduct must have been reassuring to the Supreme Court. In 1871, in
the case of United States v. Klein, 2 8 Chief Justice Chase traced the
development of the Court of Claims, noted the 1866 repeal of section
14, and stated that "[s]ince then the Court of Claims has exercised all
the functions of a court, and this court has taken full 'jurisdiction on
appeal. '289 Given the fidelity of congressional payment, the concerns
raised by Senator Davis over enforceability probably seemed more the-
oretical than real at this point.
Nevertheless, the congressional understanding regarding payment-
so intensely debated in 1863-began to fade somewhat with time. Between
281. Id.
282. Id. at 771.
283. Id. at 1512.
284. The $500,000 appropriated in 1866, see 14 Stat. 194 (1866), was to be added to
the $300,000 appropriated in 1864, see 13 Stat. 148 (1864). Apparently, no amount was
appropriated in 1865 in the interim period following the Court's decision in Gordon, 69
U.S. (2 Wall.) at 561.
285. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) vii-viii (1865).
286. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419, 427 (1866).
287. See 14 Stat. 444 (1867) ($10,000); 15 Stat. 95 (1868) ($100,000); 15 Stat. 287
(1869) ($100,000); 16 Stat. 235 (1870) ($100,000).
288. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). In this case, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of certain "loyalty requirements" included in certain Civil War claims
legislation which applied to claimants even though they had complied with the President's
Proclamation of Amnesty.
289. Id. at 144-45.
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1871 and 1875, Congress continued to make lump sum appropriations
but dropped budget language which had previously implied they were
for prospective judgments. 290 In 1872 Congress refused to pay a judgment
in only one isolated instance. 29' Congress abandoned the prospective,
lump sum approach in 1876 and appropriated $6,292.11 to pay seven
specific judgments. 292 The House debated the appropriateness of this
change the next year when the specific appropriation approach was used
again. 293 Attacking this change, Congressman Garfield of Ohio argued
that "[tihis attempt to pick them out man by man makes the House
of Representatives a sort of revisory power over the judgments of our
courts. ' 294 Denying this motivation, Congressman Clymer stated that the
principal reason for the change was to prevent the reoccurrence of a
single, large judgment from exhausting the fund and leaving later judg-
ment creditors with nothing. 295 While in 1863 the gross versus specific
appropriation issue was debated in terms of its implications on the
broader constitutional questions of finality and enforceability, 296 by 1877
most members of Congress took the Article III status of the Court of
Claims for granted. Thus, most appeared to share the view of Con-
gressman Potter that since both sides agreed that the judgments must
be paid, the form of payment was "a question . . . not worth while
to dispute about. '297 Thereafter, Congress commenced appropriating
retrospectively for specific judgments. 29
The Supreme Court did not react immediately to this change. 299
However, in 1885 Taney's "lost opinion" in Gordon v. United States
was found and published by the Supreme Court. 300 Taney's opinion
linked the Article III status of the Court of Claims to its ability to
enforce its judgments. Taney had returned to the 1792 precedent estab-
290. During this period, the amount appropriated was simply "[t]o pay judgments of
the court of claims." See 16 Stat. 480 (1871) ($500,000); 17 Stat. 82 (1872) ($400,000);
17 Stat. 508 (1873) ($400,000); 18 Stat. 108 (1874) ($1,000,000); 18 Stat. 369 (1875)
($400,000).
291. See Act of May 8, 1872, ch. 140, 17 Stat. 82 (1872) ("[N]o part of this sum
shall be paid upon any judgment rendered in favor of George Chorpenning growing out
of any service rendered in carrying the mail.").
292. See Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 105, 19 Stat. 347 (1876).
293. 6 Cong. Rec. 585-88 (1877).
294. Id. at 585.
295. Id. at 587.
296. See Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 398-400 (1863).
297. 6 Cong. Rec. 588 (1877).
298. Between 1876 and 1894, Congress normally appropriated funds pursuant to a list
of specifically named individuals and judgments. See, e.g., 19 Stat. 347 (1877); 21 Stat.
252 (1880); 23 Stat. 452 (1885); 26 Stat. 534-37 (1890); 28 Stat. 450-76 (1894). But see
22 Stat. 8 (1882).
299. In United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 603-04 (1878), the Supreme
Court continued to assume the judicial status of the Court of Claims.
300. See Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1885).
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lished in Hayburn's Case0 and had argued that "[t]he award of exe-
cution is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a
court exercising judicial power." 3 ' Specifically, Taney was concerned
that congressional appropriations for a judgment "will be opened to
debate" and that consequently "the real and ultimate judicial power
will . . . be exercised by the Legislative Department."3 3 Not being an
Article III court, Taney had concluded that the Supreme Court could
not review the decisions of the Court of Claims. Taney's "lost opinion,"
written in early 1864, had not considered the possibility that prospective,
lump sum appropriations could avoid this particular problem.,' But by
1885 Taney's opinion had acquired a new significance with the change
in appropriation methods. In 1895 Congress resumed lump sum appro-
priations but on a retrospective basis.30
Throughout this period, Congress honored virtually every judgment
of the Court of Claims. °6 The Supreme Court continued to assume the
Article III status of the Court of Claims 0 7 despite lack of enforcea-
bility.108 However, with publication of Taney's "lost opinion," the Su-
preme Court acquired a strange "trump card" which it could invoke
in case congressional payment faltered. Congress and Court had evolved
an uneasy accommodation on the question of payment and non-enfor-
cibility.
2. Accommodation on Advisory Jurisdiction
In 1863, the original House bill reorganizing the advisory Court of
Claims sought to make its decisions final and to give "the court juris-
diction of all claims for which the Government would be liable in law
301, Id, at 703,
302, Id, at 702,
303, Id, at 702-03,
304, See id, With regard to when Taney's opinion was written, see United States v.
Jones, 119 U,S, 477, 478, 7 S. Ct. 283, 283 (1886).
305, See, e,g,, 28 Stat, 868 (1895); 29 Stat. 26 (1896); 31 Stat. 315-316 (1900); 33
Stat, 1250 (1905).
306, Note, The Court of Claims: Judicial Power and Congressional Review, 46 Harv.
I, Rev. 677, 685 n,63 (1933). In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570, 82 S. Ct.
1459, 1483 (1962), the Supreme Court refered to this note and stated, "A study concluded
in 1933 found only 15 Instances in 70 years when Congress had refused to pay a judgment."
307. See, e.g,, United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477, 477-78, 7 S. Ct. 283, 283-84
(1886); United States v. Louisiana, 123 U.S. 32, 35-36, 8 S. Ct. 17, 18-19 (1887); Minnesota
v, Hitchcock, 185 U,S, 373, 380, 22 S. Ct. 650, 653 (1902); Kansas v. United States,
204 1,S, 331, 342, 27 S, Ct, 288, 391 (1907).
308. Both federal and state courts abided by the rule that a judgment could only be
paid from a legislative appropriation expressly made for such purpose. See, e.g., Reeside
v, Walker, 52 U,S, (11 How.) 272, 290.91 (1850); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v.
Ch mbeors, 169 Cal, 131, 135, 145 P, 1025, 1026 (1915); Carter v. State, 42 La. Ann.
927, 932, 8 So, 836, 837 (1890); Higgionbotham's v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.)
627, 641 (1874).
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or equity, if it were suable in a court of justice," 3°0 However, the Senate,
as previously indicated, was unwilling to accept both finality and a
completely "judicial model" of claims jurisdiction.?10 Accordingly, the
Court of Claims' basic jurisdiction over claims remained the same after
the 1863 reorganization as before; viz., limited to claims based on
contract law, a federal statute, or a federal regulation."' Its decisions,
however, were no longer advisory,
Between 1863 and 1883, Congress enacted various statutes conferring
(or sometimes restricting) special jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to
resolve claims arising out of the Civil War, 3 2 Though the volume of
such claims was substantial during this period, 3 ' the basic jurisdiction
of the Court of Claims remained limited principally to contract and
pension claims." 4 Congress retained jurisdiction over all other legal
claims"'-mmost notably tort and "taking" 31 6 cases, In 1868, the Supreme
Court acknowledged Congress' jurisdiction over tort claims by observing
that "[i]n such cases, where it is proper for the nation to furnish a
remedy, Congress has wisely reserved the matter for its own determi-
nation, ' 317 In 1879 the Court commented on "taking" cases and stated
that "[lit is to be regretted that Congress has made no provision by
309, Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Ses§, 304-05 (1863),
310, See supra notes 254T55 and accompanying text.
311, Compare Act of Feb, 24, 1855, ch. 122, § !, !Q Stat. 612, 612 (1855) with Act
of Mar. 3, 1863, ch, 92, § 2, 12 Stat, 765, 765 (1863), However, the 1863 amendments
expanded the court's jurisdigtion slightly to include counterclaims and setoffs of the United
States against claimants, see id, § 3, and reduced the court's jurisdiction slightly by
eliminating reference cases from either House, see id. § 2.
312. Eg., Abandoned and Captured Property Act of 1863, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820
(1863); Act of July 4, 1864, gh. 240, !3 Stat. 381 (l864); Act of May 9, 1866, Ch. 75,
14 Stat. 44 (1866); Act of Feb, 21, 1867, ch, 57, 14 Stat. 397 (1867); owma Act of
Mar. 3, 1883, gh, 116, 22 Stat. 485 (1883).
313, James G. Randall, Civil War historian, wrote that with re ard to paptutred and
abandoned property,
the Court pf Claims found its dogket well crowde. The total armoqnt paid out
in judgments in such cases up to February 4, 1888, was reported as $9,864,30075,When we remember that the surs involved i g gech case were usually small,
and that these figures represent only the claims which were allowed, we can
form an idea of the vast amount pf this litigation which the court handled.
Randall, Captured and Abandoned Property During the Civil War, 19 Am, I-list. Rev.
65, 74-75 (1913); see also Richardson, -istory, J urisdiction, and Practice of the Court
of Claims of the United States, 7 So, L, Rev. 781, 790 (1882); 17 Ct. Cl. 3, 11 (1881-
1882); 2 W, Cowen, P. Nichols & M, Bennett, supr-a note 88, at 28,
314, See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch: 92, § 2, 12 Stat. 765, 765 (1863); see also, e.g.,
H.R, Misc. Doc. No, 50, 40th Cong,, Ist Sess. (1867).
315. Obviously, Congrgss also retained jurisdiction over purely moral" claims niot
resting on any partiular legal or equitable principal of law, United States v, Realty Co.,
163 U.S. 427, 440, 16 S, Ct. 1120, 1125 (1896).
316, The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, "nor shall private property be t@ken
for public use, without just compensatior,"
317. Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 275-76 (1868):
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any general law for ascertaining and paying this just compensation."3',
By the 1880's, Congress' retention of the "legislative model" of claims
adjudication for most non-contract claims again led to the introduction
of various proposals designed to relieve Congress of this "private busi-
ness." 3 19
In 1887, the House-led by Congressman Tucker of Virginia-passed
a bill designed to give the Court of Claims full jurisdiction over all
legal, equitable, and admiralty claims against the United States.3 20 It
also provided for concurrent jurisdiction in the federal circuit courts up
to the amount of $10,000.321 Its acknowledged effect was "that the
United States can be made a party defendant in any suit where an
individual could be made a party defendant. 3 22 However, the Senate,
as it had nearly a quarter century before, balked at accepting a completely
"judicial model" of claims jurisdiction for the courts.3 23 The Senate
subtracted two significant provisions from the House bill: it excluded
tort claims; and it reduced the amounts for concurrent jurisdiction to
$1,000 or less for district courts and between $1,000 and $10,000 for
circuit courts.32 4 The Senate also made an important addition by giving
the Court of Claims special jurisdiction to render advisory findings, but
no judgment, on any claim specifically referred to it by either House
of Congress or an Executive Department.325 However, if the Court of
Claims found that the referred claim fell within its regular claims ju-
risdiction, it was required to proceed to judgment.3 26 On March 3, 1887,
the Tucker Act, as this compromise came to be known, became law.3 27
After the adoption of the Tucker Act, the Court of Claims acquired
jurisdiction over virtually all legal claims against the United States except
tort claims.32 8 The practical effect was to expand the court's jurisdiction
beyond contract to admiralty, tax, pay, and "taking" cases.3 29 Congress
318. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879).
319. See 18 Cong. Rec. 622 (1887).
320. Id. at 624. The bill, however, did exclude suits based on a patent infringement
by the Government and Civil War claims by inclusion of a six year statute of limitations.
Id.
321. Id.
322. See remarks by Congressman Reed, id.
323. Id. at 2175-76, 2676-81.
324. See id. at 2175-76, 2676-81.
325. See Tucker Act, ch. 359, §§ 12-14, 24 Stat. 505, 507-08 (1887). With regard to
Congressional "reference cases", the Tucker Act required the Court of Claims to report
only its findings of facts. Id. at § 14. With regard to Executive "reference cases", the
Tucker Act required the Court of Claims to submit both findings of fact and conclusions
of law. Id. § 12. No judgment was to be entered in either situation. See id. §§ 12, 14.
326. Id. § 13.
327. Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887).
328. See id. § 1. Pension and certain Civil War claims were also excluded.
329. 2 W. Cowen, P. Nichols & M. Bennett, supra note 88, at 43-51.
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retained jurisdiction over tort and moral claims.33 ° By allowing factual
disputes arising from tort or moral claims to be determined by the
Court of Claims, Congress hoped to relieve itself "from much of the
private business that is imposed upon it."'' In this context, the Court
of Claims analogized its relationship to Congress in congressional "ref-
erence cases" as being much like that which existed between courts of
equity and courts of law. It noted that Congress, like a court of equity,
could refer factual disputes to the Court of Claims which, like a court
of law, could render the requested findings, but only if there was no
adequate remedy at law under its regular claims jurisdiction. 3 2
It will be recalled that the historic confrontation between Congress
and the federal judiciary in Hayburn's Case over the finality of the
courts' judgments on claims was resolved by an amendment which limited
the courts' role to an essentially fact-gathering one."' Accordingly, there
was some precedent for advisory fact-finding jurisdiction. However, the
Supreme Court had long maintained that a federal court could not
render advisory opinions on questions of law. 3 4 In 1893, the Supreme
Court, in In re Sanborn,3 3  considered an appeal from an Executive
"reference case" which contained both findings of fact and, unlike
congressional "reference cases," conclusions of law.33 6 The Supreme
Court held that there was no statutory right to appeal because the
findings and conclusions did not result in a "judgment" which was
appealable under the Tucker Act. 3 7 Nevertheless, in an attempt to rec-
oncile the authority to issue advisory legal opinions to executive agencies
with the Article III status of the Court of Claims, the Supreme Court
330. See Tucker Act, 1887, ch. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. 505 (1887). In United States v.
Realty Co., 163 U.S. at 440, 16 S. Ct. at 1125, Congress's power to pay "debts" was
defined broadly to include a claim which "grows out of general principles of right and
justice; when, in other words, it is based upon considerations of a moral or merely
honorary nature, such as are binding on the conscience or the honor of an individual,
although the debt could obtain no recognition in a court of law."
331. See 18 Cong. Rec. 622 (1887) (remarks of Rep. Springer).
332. See Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 447, 488-
89 (1932), which approvingly quoted its prior opinion of Stovall v. United States, 26 Ct.
Cl. 226, 233 (1891), where an identical relationship existed under the Bowman Act, see
Act of Mar. 3, 1883, ch. 116, § 1, 22 Stat. 485, 485 (1883).
333. See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
334. 3 The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay 488-89 (H. Johnston ed.
1890) (correspondence between Chief Justice Jay and Secretary of State Jefferson in which
the Supreme Court refused to render an advisory opinion). But see 1 C. Warren, The
Supreme Court in United States History 596-97 (1926) (detailing correspondence from
Justice Johnson to President Monroe in which an advisory opinion, in fact, was given).
335. 148 U.S. 222, 13 S. Ct. 577 (1893).
336. See supra note 325. The reason why Congress may have permitted conclusions
of law in Executive "reference cases" was because many departments lacked adequate
legal staffs at that time. See Pocono Pines Hotels, 73 Ct. Cl. at 487.
337. 148 U.S. at 226, 13 S. Ct. at 579. Cf. Ex Parte Atocha, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 439
(1873) (i~volving statute that provided for final judgment but failed to provide for appeal).
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stated that "[w]e regard the function of the Court of Claims, in such
a case, as ancillary and advisory only.""33 With this decision, another
uneasy accommodation was reached between Congress and the Court,
this time on the issue of advisory jurisdiction. 39
3. Accommodation on Theory
In Chisholm v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that no consent
by a state was necessary for exercise of its Article III jurisdiction over
a claim "between a state and citizens of another state." It also noted,
without deciding the question, that an analogous issue existed with regard
to claims involving "controversies to which the United States shall be
a party." 34° As we have seen, this suggestion that Article III of the
Constitution contained a "judicial model" of claims determination was
effectively repudiated by adoption of the Eleventh Amendment . 41 And
with the triumph of the "legislative model," many members of Congress
came to explain their ability to determine claims as arising under their
power over appropriations under Article I, Section 9 of the Constitu-
tion.3 42 For its part, the Supreme Court acknowledged its inability to
determine claims during the pre-Civil War period by simply reciting,
without explanation, the rule against suability without consent.3 43
After the Civil War, the evolution of the "hybrid model" forced
the Supreme Court to develop a comprehensive theory which would
justify Congress' ability to both (1) continue to consider some categories
of claims, such as tort and strictly moral claims, and (2) authorize other
categories to be determined by a special Court of Claims which was
subject to Supreme Court review. In response to this need, the simple
rule of non-suability without consent was transformed into an elaborate
338. 148 U.S. at 226, 13 S. Ct. at 579.
339. In later periods, the Court of Claims's advisory jurisdiction played a significant
role in the debate over its Article III status. See Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438,
454, 49 S. Ct. 411, 414 (1929); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 569, 53 S. Ct.
751, 756 (1933); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 579-83, 82 S. Ct. 1459, 1487-90
(1962).
340. See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See also supra notes 115-29 and accompanying
text.
341. See supra notes 130-35.
342. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1852) (remarks of Rep. Brown);
Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1854) (remarks of Sen. Brodhead); Cong. Globe,
37th Cong., 3d Sess. 312 (1863) (remarks of Sen. Doolittle).
343. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821); United States v.
McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 287-88 (1846); Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.)
385, 389 (1850). In United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 1 S. Ct. 240 (1882), the Supreme
Court noted that although the non-suability of government has "been repeatedly asserted
here, the principle has never been discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always
been treated as an established doctrine." Id. at 207.
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doctrine called "sovereign immunity" which was justified on the basis
of public policy and English legal precedent.'"
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the public policy justification
quickly gained prominence. In 1865, Justice Gray of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts articulated this view in Briggs v. Light-Boats3 45
when he stated that permitting suit without consent would "endanger
the performance of the public duties of the sovereign" since it would
force the executive "to submit to the judicial tribunals the control and
disposition of his public property, his instruments and means of carrying
on the government in war and peace, and the money in his treasury."
In 1868, the Supreme Court in The Siren echoed this justification and
stated that "[tihe doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy . . .- 3.
In 1882 the Supreme Court examined the basis for the doctrine in some
detail in United States v. Lee.3 47 While differing on the application of
the doctrine, both the majority3 48 and minority3 49 opinions continued to
rely primarily on the public policy justification for the rule although
extensive reference to English historical precedent was also employed.35 0
English legal precedent was also adopted in 1889 as a major jus-
tification in order to reconcile the rule of non-suability with the federal
courts' apparent jurisdiction under Article 11I. 511 This explanation of the
Constitution was not a new one. During the ratification debates, Alex-
ander Hamilton had argued with regard to states that "[it is inherent
in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent" and that there was no "surrender of
this immunity in the plan of the convention. 35 2 Justice Iredell, the lone
dissenter in Chisholm v. Georgia, also relied heavily on English precedent
344. It is said that whether a glass is viewed as half-full or half-empty depends entirely
on the frame of reference of the observer. The same can be said of the sovereign immunity
doctrine. In later periods, it would be condemned as a conservative doctrine which justified
why some suits could not be filed. However, in the post-Civil War period, most courts
embraced the doctrine as a progressive one precisely because it justified why some suits
could be filed for the first time.
345. 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 157, 162-63 (1865).
346. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868).
347. 106 U.S. 196, 1 S. Ct. 240 (1882).
348. Id. at 206, 1 S. Ct. at 248-49.
349. See id. at 226, 1 S. Ct. at 265-66. ("[lI]t is essential to the common defense and
general welfare that the sovereign should not, without its consent, be dispossessed by
judicial process of forts, arsenals, military posts, and ships of war, necessary to guard
the national existence against insurrection and invasion; of custom-houses and revenue
cutters, employed in the collection of the revenue; or of light-houses and light-ships,
established for the security of commerce with foreign nations and among the different
parts of the country.").
350. See id. at 205-06, 227-34, 1 S. Ct. at 248-49, 266-70.
351. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504 (1889).
352. Supra note 86.
1985]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
for his conclusion that a state, as a sovereign, possessed an immunity
from suits not consented to and since there were no longer any kings
such consent must be given by the legislative branch.353 Moreover, even
Justice Gray, who announced the "broader" public policy justification
in Briggs v. Light-Boats, had first noted that "[iln the older books,
this is often put upon the technical ground that, all judicial writs being
in the name of the king as the fountain of justice, the king cannot by
his own writ command himself. 35 4 Nevertheless, the 1793 rejection of
the "sovereignty" theory by the majority in Chisholm v. Georgia had
forever discredited this justification.355 In 1889 the Supreme Court in
Hans v. Louisiana5 6 re-examined the majority decision in Chisholm v.
Georgia. It concluded that the nation's adverse reaction to that decision
had vindicated the view of Justice Iredel1I5 7 and Hamilton35 8 that the
exercise of the federal court jurisdiction under Article III was conditioned
on a state (and by inference the federal government) waiving its sovereign
immunity by enacting a statute consenting to suit. 5 9
The sovereign immunity doctrine-as justified by policy and precedent-
provided a flexible theoretical explanation for much of the "hybrid model"
through its elastic concept of consent;3 61 consent to suit in contract did not
mean consent to suit in tort;36' consent could be conditioned on requiring a
claim to be filed in a special court3 62 pursuant to special rules; 363 and consent
353. Supra note 123.
354. 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 157, 162 (1865).
355. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205-08, 1 S. Ct. 240, 247-50 (1882);
Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 342-43 (1879).
356. 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504 (1890).
357. Id. at 18-19, 10 S. Ct. at 508-09 ("In view of the manner in which that decision
[Chisholm v. Georgia] was received by the country, the adoption of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, the light of history and the reason of the thing, we think we are at liberty to
prefer Justice Iredell's views in this regard.").
358. See id. at 12-15, 10 S. Ct. at 502-05. The Supreme Court stated that "[i]t seems
to us that these views [regarding sovereign immunity] of those great advocates [including
Hamilton] and defenders of the Constitution were most sensible and just; and they apply
equally to the present case .... ." Id. at 14-15, 10 S. Ct. at 504-05.
359. See id. at 13, 10 S. Ct. at 504.
360. During this period, there was a tendancy to construe Congressional consent to
suit narrowly. E.g., Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122 (1868); Gibbons v.
United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269 (1868); Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341
(1879). This was consistent with the general practice of interpreting all statutes relating
to the federal government narrowly so as not to limit or abridge the government's sovereign
powers unless specifically expressed. Cf. The dollar Savings Bank v. United States 86
U.S. (19 Wall.) 227, 239 (1873) (statutory remedies not construed to limit government's
common law remedy of debt); United States v. Herron, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 251 (1873)
(government debt not barred by bankruptcy statute).
361. See Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 274 (1868).
362. See United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. at 602-05.
363. Congress did not necessarily subject the government and claimant to the same
procedural rules with regard to the claims jurisdiction it relinquished to the Court of
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to suit could later be revoked. 6 ' During this period, the foregoing explana-
tion of the sovereign immunity doctrine also became popular in the states.36
Nevertheless, this doctrine failed to explain one fundamental aspect of the
"hybrid model": Congress's power to determine claims through private
legislation.I'
In 1895, the Supreme Court clarified for the first time the consti-
tutional basis of Congress's power to determine claims in United States
v. Realty Company. 67 In that opinion the Supreme Court ignored the
"appropriations" theory which suggested that claims were fiscal questions
exclusively for Congress3 68 and held, instead, that such power came from
Congress's authority "to pay the debts" of the United States.3 69 The
Claims. See Freund, Private Claims Against the State, 8 Pol. Sci. Q. 625, 630-31 (1893).
For example, for a time neither the claimant nor any person interested in the claim was
permitted to testify in support of a claim although the government was permitted to call
them for examination if it deemed it appropriate. See Act of June 25, 1868, ch. .71, §
4, 15 Stat. 75 (1868); Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, § 8, 24 Stat. 505, 506 (1887)
(repealing the testimony prohibition). At one time, the government was given the right
to depose, the claimant, but no reciprocal right was given the claimant. See Act of Mar.
3, 1863, ch. 92, § 8, 12 Stat. 765, 766-67 (1863). The government was permitted to appeal
any final judgment while a claimant could do so only if certain monetary amounts were
exceeded. See id. § 5; Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 71, § 1, 15 Stat. 75 (1868). The
government had a special right to move for a new trial on the basis of fraud for up to
two years after final disposition of the case. Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 71, § 2, 15 Stat.
75 (1868). Finally, any claimant who practiced fraud in prosecuting a claim automatically
forfeited the claim to the government. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 11, 12 Stat. 765
(1863).
364. See Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337 (1879); Railroad Co. v. Alabama,
101 U.S. 832 (1879); Baltzer v. North Carolina, 161 U.S. 240, 16 S. Ct. 500 (1896).
365. See Davie, Suing the State, 18 Am. L. Rev. 814 (1884). However, a few states
such as Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi appear to have waived much of their immunity
by statute. Id. at 827; Martindale, The State and Its Creditors, 7 So. L. Rev. 544, 545-
46 (1881).
366. This power is not as self-evident as one might suppose. Many states have significant
limitations on their legislature's power to enact private legislation involving private claims.
See Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370, 380, 60 S. Ct. 600, 603-04 (1939).
For example, in Bourn v. Hart, 93 Cal. 321, 28 P. 951 (1892), the California Supreme
Court held that its state legislature violated its state constitutional prohibition against gifts
of public funds when it enacted private legislation awarding a state prison guard $10,000
for tort injuries suffered while on the job.
367. 163 U.S. 427, 16 S. Ct. 1120 (1896). Before this case, the Supreme Court had
recognized the existence of Congress's power over claims without specifying its consti-
tutional basis'. See, e.g., Heirs of Emerson v. Hall, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 409 (1839); United
States v. Price, 116 U.S. 43, 6 S. Ct. 235 (1885).
368. The "appropriations" theory was popular in Congress before the Civil War. See
supra note 342. To some members of Congress, this meant Congress could not delegate
this power. See Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 312 (1863) (remarks of Sen. Doolittle).
369. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440, 16 S. Ct. 1120, 1125 (1896)
("Under the provisions of the Constitution [Article I, § 8], Congress has power to lay
and collect taxes, etc., 'to pay the debts' of the United States. Having the power to raise
money for that purpose, it of course follows that it has power when the money is raised
to appropriate it to the same object.").
LOUISIANA LA WREVIEW
term "debts" was construed broadly to include not only legal obligations,
but also "those debts or claims which rest upon a merely equitable or
honorary obligation, and which would not be recoverable in a court of
law if existing against an individual. 3 70 The Court further noted that
this had been the congressional practice since the adoption of the Con-
stitution.3 7' By this construction of the Constitution, the Supreme Court
was able to uphold Congress's traditional practice of determining both
moral and legal claims while implying that the federal judiciary possessed
an overlapping, but not necessarily superior, role for the legal claims.37
Thus, after the Civil War, Congress and the federal judiciary began
sharing the responsibility for determining claims against the United States.
The triumph of this "hybrid model" of claims determination was de-
pendent on a series of uneasy accommodations on the issue of congres-
sional payment and judicial non-enforceability, the question of advisory
jurisdiction, and the persuasiveness of the sovereign immunity doctrine
as a theoretical justification for the "hybrid model" itself. By the close
of the nineteenth century, these accommodations had been worked out.
However, during the first third of the twentieth century the accom-
modations supporting the "hybrid model" began to break down.
C. Decline-The Accommodations Break Down
1. Breakdown-Advisory Jurisdiction
In 1910, the accommodation on advisory jurisdiction began to break
down when Congress amended the Tucker Act to expand the fact-finding
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in congressional "reference cases"
to include advisory conclusions of law.3 73 As noted, in In re Sanborn,
the Supreme Court was able to reconcile the Court of Claims's Article
III status with its advisory duties by characterizing the latter as "an-
cillary" when such advisory role was confined to a few fact-finding
chores for Congress or an occasional opinion to an executive depart-
ment.3 74 By 1910, both the justices of the Court of Claims and members
of the referring congressional committees had become dissatisfied with
reports which were necessarily limited to the facts. 75 It was noted that
"very little, if any, help was obtained by the committee in many cases
370. Id.
371. Id. at 441, 16 S. Ct. at 1126.
372. Once Congress appropriated funds to pay a claim, neither the treasurer nor the
courts had authority to inquire into the merits of such payment. United States v. Jordan,
113 U.S. 418, 5 S. Ct. 585 (1885); United States v. Price, 116 U.S. 43, 6 S. Ct. 235
(1885).
373. See Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 409, 36 Stat. 837 (1910).
374. See supra notes 335-38 and accompanying text.
375. See 45 Cong. Rec. 3491-92 (1910).
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... ,376 Accordingly, Congress amended the Tucker Act to require
not only a report on the facts but also a report on "the nature . . .
of the demand, either as a claim, legal or equitable, or as a gratuity,
against the United States and the amount, if any, legally or equitably
due." 177 This amendment greatly expanded the scope of the Court of
Claims's advisory role.
In 1911, in Muskrat v. United States, the Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of a statute which conferred special advisory juris-
diction on the Court of Claims to determine the validity of previous
acts of Congress which affected the distribution of certain Cherokee
property . 7  Unlike "reference cases," this statute specifically authorized
appeal to the Supreme Court. 79 The Court of Claims had determined
that the acts in question were valid. On appeal, the Supreme Court
relied on cases such as Hayburn's Case for the proposition that Congress
could not constitutionally confer jurisdiction on an Article III court to
determine the validity of an act of Congress in proceedings which were
essentially advisory in nature (i.e., lacked a genuine case or contro-
versy). 8 0 After concluding that it could not entertain the appeal, the
Supreme Court closed by observing that "[als Congress . . . evidently
intended to provide a review of the judgment of the Court of Claims
in this court . . . we think the act cannot be held to intend to confer
jurisdiction on that court separately considered." '38 ' In light of the Su-
preme Court's acquiescence in the Court of Claims' "ancillary" advisory
jurisdiciion in In re Sanborn,82 this final sentence implied that the Court
of Claims might not necessarily be subject to the same constitutional
limitations that regular Article III courts were subject to. This ambiguity
over the Court of Claims' status, however, did not stop Congress from
referring cases to it.
During 1912 over 3,600 congressional "reference cases" were dock-
376. Id. at 3491 (remarks of Rep. Diekema).
377. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 409, 36 Stat. 837 (1910). The requirement that the
Court of Claims determine "the amount, if any, legally or equitably due" was added as
a floor amendment over the objection of the bill's original sponsor who feared it might
erode Congress's discretion over moral claims. 45 Cong. Rec. 3491-92 (1910). The Court
of Claims, however, construed its authority narrowly to only apply to situations where
amounts could "be based upon legal or equitable principles as recognized by or enforced
in the courts." Montgomery v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 574, 626 (1914).
378. 219 U.S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250 (1911).
379. Compare In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222, 13 S. Ct. 577 (1893) with Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346, 350, 31 S. Ct. 250, 251 (1911).
380. Although the statute required the federal government to defend the constitutionality
of the acts in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the federal government had
no direct interest in the outcome of the contest since it did not share in the distribution
of the Cherokee property. Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 360-63, 31 S. Ct. at 255-56.
381. Id. at 363, 31 S. Ct. at 256.
382. See supra notes 335-38 and accompanying text.
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eted with the Court of Claims." 3 In 1914 the number was over 3,100.384
The Court of Claims acknowledged the tremendous increase in such
claims following the 1910 amendment as follows: "The docket of this
court shows that while the number of references which came from
Congress during the five years commencing with 1891, four years after
the enactment of the Tucker Act, was about 2,700; the number during
the five years prior to 1915 was about 8,200 . . . ,,385 During this
period, most of the "reference cases" related to old Civil War claims.
3 86
In 1914 the Court of Claims, in Montgomery v. United States, 87
defended its expanded advisory jurisdiction by developing the concept
implied in Muskrat. In effect, the Court of Claims asserted that due
to its non-Article III origins and its special jurisdiction over government
claims, it possessed a unique constitutional status which permitted it to
exercise a "duality of jurisdictions." '388 The Court of Claims described
its dual jurisdictions as "cases where the statute authorizes the court
to proceed to final judgment, from which appeals lie direct to the
Supreme Court, and . . . those classes of reference, congressional and
departmental, in which its action does not result in final judgment, and
• . . [from which] no appeal lies. 3 89 It justified its advisory jurisdiction
in "reference cases" by noting its Article I origins as an advisory court
to Congress39° and the persistence of this unique status since the Tucker
Act did not confer concurrent jurisdiction for "reference cases" on the
federal district courts.3" It justified its ability to exercise Article III
powers by noting that when Congress made its decision final, "it became
vested necessarily with judicial power, because the cases of which it has
cognizance are suits to which the United States must be a party, and
its judgments, subject to appeal, are final judgments. 3 92 Finally, the
Court of Claims referred to In re, Sanborn to show that its possession
of a "duality of jurisdictions" was not necessarily an incompatible
mixture.3 93
383. Chase v. United States, 50 Ct. Cl. 293, 315-16 (1915).
384. Id. at 316.
385. Id. at 315.
386. Id. Following Court of Claims review, Congress appropriated funds to pay many
of these Civil War claims in 1915 in the Omnibus Claims Act, see Act of Mar. 4, 1915,
ch. 140, 38 Stat. 962 (1915).
387. 49 Ct. Cl. 575 (1914).
388. Id. at 608-10.
389. Id. at 608. The Court of Claims reiterated this view in subsequent cases. Chase
v. United States, 50 Ct. Cl. 293, 298 (1915); Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co., 73 Ct.
Cl. at 488.
390. Montgomery v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. at 608-09. The Court of Claims relied
on Justice Tanney's "lost opinion" in Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1885), for
the proposition that Congress may "undoubtedly establish" advisory tribunals to review
claims against the United States. Montgomery, 49 Ct. Cl. at 602-03.
391. 49 Ct. Cl. at 608.
392. Id. at 609.
393. Id. See also In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222, 13 S. Ct. 577 (1893).
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Thus, by 1914 the expansion of the court's advisory jurisdiction
had profoundly altered the Court of Claims's own self-image. Rather
than viewing itself as an Article III court which exercised "ancillary"
advisory powers," ' the Court of claims began to view itself as a special
congressional court which also exercised judicial powers. 39 In the fol-
lowing years, the Court of Claims appears to have basked in the glory
of its "duality of jurisdictions," finding that it attracted interesting
cases, public attention, and capable candidates for judgeships.3 96 Al-
though it ran the risk of not being considered an Article III court, the
Court of Claims probably concluded that this did not create a significant
disadvantage so long as the Supreme Court continued to review its
decisions, and Congress continued to pay the judgments rendered under
its non-advisory jurisdiction.3 97
The Supreme Court's position on the constitutional status of the
Court of Claims did not change as quickly as the Court of Claims
itself. In 1924, in Miles v. Graham,3 98 the Supreme Court continued to
treat the judges of the Court of Claims as Article III judges for the
purpose of determining the effect of changes in the tax laws on their
judicial salaries. However, the growth in the Court of Claims's advisory
jurisdiction could no longer be dismissed as "ancillary." In 1928, the
Supreme Court, in Ex Parte Bakelite Corp.3 99 expressly backed off from
its position in Miles v. Graham.40 0 Although Bakelite involved the con-
stitutional status of the Court of Customs Appeals and not the Court
of Claims, it nevertheless announced, by way of dictum, that under its
prior decisions "the Court of Claims is a legislative court specially
created to consider claims for money against the United States, and .
. Congress may require it to give advisory decisions. ' 40 1 Since the
394. See In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222, 13 S. Ct. 577 (1893).
395. See Montgomery, 49 Ct. Cl. at 608-09.
396. See 2 W. Cowen, P. Nichols & M. Bennett, supra note 88, at 64 ("But the
Court of Claims would appear in the period under review to have derived from its advisory
jurisdiction a far more important, varied, and interesting diet of cases, and consequently,
greater appeal to the more able candidates for judgeships, and a more conspicuous place
in the public and congressional eyes.").
397. See id.
398. 268 U.S. 501, 45 S. Ct. 601 (1925).
399. 279 U.S. 438, 49 S. Ct. 411 (1928).
400. Id. at 455, 49 S. Ct. at 415.
401. Id. at 454-55, 49 S. Ct. at 415. In Bakelite, the Supreme Court held that the
Court of Customs Appeal was a "legislative court" and therefore Congress could authorize
it to consider appeals from certian advisory recommendations of the Tariff Commission.
By way of analogy, the Supreme Court referred to the Court of Claims and stated:
From the outset Congress has required it [the Court of Claims] to give merely
advisory decisions on many matters. Under the act creating it all of its decisions
were to have effect as binding judgments, but others were still to be merely
advisory. This is true at the present time. A duty to give decisions which are
advisory only, and so without force as judicial judgments, may be laid on a
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Supreme Court historically had accepted appellate review of final judg-
ments from other "legislative courts" such as federal territorial courts,
this change in position did not necessarily imply a rupture of that critical
relationship between the two courts.4 0 2 Ironically, the most significant
consequence of the Bakelite decision would be a change in the behavior
of Congress, rather than the Supreme Court, toward the Court of Claims.
2. Breakdown-Payment and Non-Enforceability
By the late 1920's, the accommodation regarding congressional pay-
ment and judicial non-enforceability of judgments began to break down.
As noted, in the post-Civil War era Congress routinely paid such judg-
ments without compulsion and the Supreme Court reviewed such judg-
ments without insisting on enforceability.4 0 3 However, after the 1910
expansion of the Court of Claims' advisory jurisdiction, Congress became
accustomed to revising the decisions of the Court of Claims in "reference
cases," and payment was far from automatic in such cases. 40 4 In time,
the "duality of jurisdictions" led to significant confusion in Congress
and some members came to erroneously believe that all of the decisions
of the Court of Claims were advisory and subject to its revision .4 5 The
1928 Bakelite obiter statement that the Court of Claims was merely a
"legislative court" served only to undermine further an already shaky
congressional commitment to routine payment of judgments.
In the early 1930's, the "duality of jurisdictions," the congressional
legislative court, but not on a constitutional court established under article 3.
Id. at 454, 49 S. Ct. at 414 (footnotes omitted). The foregoing clearly reveals that the
expansion of advisory jurisdiction was the major factor in changing the Supreme Court's
view on the constitutional status of the Court of Claims.
402. In American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828), the Supreme
Court held that courts created by Congress in the territories were "legislative courts."
The Supreme Court had consistently exercised appellate review over territorial courts
although it had never satisfactorily explained why it could do so. See, e.g., Freeborn v.
Smith, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 160, 173 (1864). See also Note, the Court of Claims: Judicial
Power and Congressional Review, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 677, 682 n.39 (1932). But see Gordon
v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1885, decided 1864) (Justice Taney's "lost opinion").
403. See supra notes 280-308 and accompanying text.
404. For example, after the 1910 expansion of the Court of Claims' advisory juris-
diction, the Court of Claims submitted a vast number of recommendations (mostly relating
to Civil War claims) which Congress refused to pay. It was not until 1915 that Congress
enacted the Omnibus Claims Act to clear most of this backlog. Act of March 4, 1915,
ch. 140, 38 Stat. 962 (1915); see also 52 Cong. Rec. 5287-89, 5320, 5471-72 (1915); Chase
v. United States, 50 Ct. Cl. 293, 295 (1915); Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co., 73 Ct.
Cl. at 490. In another case, Congress apparently twice refused to follow an advisory
recommendation of the Court of Claims relating to the "Sibley heirs." 74 Cong. Rec.
6073 (1931) (remarks of Sen. Robinson).
405. In Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co., the Court of Claims observed that "it
was . . . the vast number of [Congressional] references . . . that enabled an erroneous
opinion to exist that this character of jurisdiction represented the . . . authority of this
court and limited its activities to advisory findings of fact and opinions, without power
to conclude the . . . rights of the parties .... ." 73 Ct. Cl. at 490; see also id. at 491.
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confusion over payment, and the Bakelite dictum collided in the three
decisions rendered by the Court of Claims in Pocono Pines Hotel Co.
v. United States.40 6 In Pocono Pines I (1930), the Court of Claims
considered a claim that was filed under its regular jurisdiction by a
hotel company which had leased property to the federal government for
use as a hospital facility .4 7 The property was damaged by fire. At trial,
the government lawyers introduced no evidence on the origins of the
fire and rested their defense solely on the legal argument that under
the lease the hotel company had the burden to prove that the fire was
the government's fault. 408 The Court of Claims rejected this argument
and rendered a final judgment against the government for $227,239.53
on the ground that the government failed to prove it was not at fault.4 9
In 1931, the Pocono Pines I judgment came before Congress for
payment. 410 The Comptroller General reported that due to the nature
of the government's defense, the government had failed to introduce
testimony which showed that the fire may have been caused by the hotel
company's own defective wiring . 4 1  Relying on the Bakelite dictum,
4 2
the Comptroller General recommended that Congress should direct its
"legislative court" (the Court of Claims) to grant the government a
new trial. 413 In the Senate, this recommendation 41 4 was opposed by
406. The Court of Claims rendered three decisions under this title, at 69 Ct. Cl. 91
(1930) [hereinafter cited as Pocono Pines 11, at 73 C. Cl. 447 (1932) [hereinafter cited
as Pocono Pines II], and at 76 Ct. Cl. 334 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Pocono Pines
II] .
407. 69 Ct. Cl. 91 (1930).
408. Id. at 106.
409. Id. at 110.
410. See 74 Cong. Rec. 5939-56, 6070-84 (1931).
411. Id. at 6077-79 (letter dated February 5, 1931, from Comptroller General McCarl
to the Senate Committee on Appropriations).
412. The legal position of the Comptroller General was submitted to Congress in a
document entitled "Memorandum By The Attorney From The Comptroller General's
Office." Id. at 6083-84. The memorandum quoted extensively from the Bakelite case. See
id. at 6084. The memorandum stated that:
The Court of Claims is an agency of the Congress created with a view to
assisting the Congress in reaching a correct and just conclusion respecting certain
types of claims against the United States the payment of which is a duty fixed
by the Constitution upon the Congress. It is not a constitutional court and has
no authority to render a binding judgment against the United States. Its judg-
ments must be submitted to the Congress and may not be paid unless the
Congress makes specific appropriation for such payment.
Id. at 6083. The memorandum concluded that Congress possessed the power to direct
the Court of Claims to reconsider a judgment just as Congress could ask one of its
committees or its General Accounting Office to reconsider a matter. Id. at 6084.
413. See id. at 6079.
414. On February 25, 1931, the Senate considered the following amendment: "The
United States Court of Claims be, and it is hereby, authorized and directed . . . to grant
the United States a new trial in the case of Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United
States of America, No. J-543 .... ." Id. at 5939.
LOUISIANA LA WREVIEW
Senator Robinson of Arkansas and Senator Reed of Pennsylvania who
argued that ordering a new trial would be unfair and would constitute
an improper attempt by Congress to revise a final judgment of the
Court of Claims.4 1 5 After the defeat of this recommendation on pro-
cedural grounds, 4 6 Senator Reed introduced a new amendment providing
for full payment of the judgment. 4 7 The Senate, however, was reluctant
to appropriate $227,239.53 for a judgment it questioned. 418 This amend-
ment was also defeated,4 1 9 leaving the issue unresolved. This dilemma
was resolved by Senator Glass of Virginia who proposed that the Senate
not disturb the judgment but simply refer the matter to the Court of
Claims "without any implications whatsoever, but merely with instruc-
tions to find the facts and report them to the Senate, so that the Senate
might conclude whether or not it would make an appropriation in this
case. "420 The Glass compromise was adopted. 421
In Pocono Pines II (1932), the Court of Claims considered the
validity of the Glass compromise in the context of a motion to set aside
the referral.4 22 In a lengthy opinion, the Court of Claims traced its
history423 and the development of its two categories of jurisdiction:
regular and advisory.4 24 While recognizing that this mixture may have
caused some congressional confusion, 425 the Court concluded that nothing
in Bakelite suggested that being a legislative court "deprives them . .
. from rendering final judgments in cases where jurisdictional acts confer
such power. ' 426 Thus, the court unanimously agreed that Congress had
no power to revise its Pocono Pines I judgment of $227,239.53 which
415. See id. at 5940-42.
416. See id. at 5941-42 (improper attempt to enact legislation in a general appropriations
bill by conferring new powers on the Court of Claims).
417. Id. at 5945.
418. The feelings of most of the Senate were probably summarized by Senator Glass
*of Virginia when he-said:
If we deny this appropriation, we have a record which impugns the honor of
the Court of Claims; and if we grant the appropriation, apparently we have a
record here of paying a company $277,000 which is not entitled to a cent of
it. It is a very embarrassing situation.
Id. at 5952.
419. Id. at 6077 (13 yeas, 68 nays, 15 not voting).
420.' Id. at 6076.
421. Id. at 6077. The Glass compromise stated:
The case of the Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States of America,
No. J-543, be, and hereby is, remanded to the United States Court of Claims
with complete authority . . . to hear testimony as to the actual facts involved
in the litigation and with instructions to report its findings of facts to Congress
422. 73 Ct. Cl. 447 (1932).
423. Id. at 466-88.
424. Id. at 488-92.
425. Id. at 491.
426. Id. at 493.
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had been rendered under its regular jurisdiction. 427 Nevertheless, a ma-
jority held that the Glass compromise, unlike the original Senate rec-
ommendation, "does not seek to set aside a judgment of this court. 428
Concluding that the referral did not seek a re-evaluation of the past
judgment but only facts with respect to the future payment of that
judgment, 429 the majority treated the matter as falling within its advisory
jurisdiction, 430 docketed the matter as "Congressional Reference No.
A, ' 43' and refused to vacate the hearing on the matter. 43 2 Thus, while
the Court of Claims was unwilling to rehear the matter under its regular
jurisdiction, a majority was willing to do so under its advisory juris-
diction.
As noted, routine congressional payment of judgments had obviated
the need for judicial insistence on enforceability. This accommodation,
already shaky, was toppled in Pocono Pines 11 (1932). While maintaining
that Congress could not technically revise its judgments, the Court of
Claims in fact held that Congress could constitutionally refuse to pay
its judgments433 and could require it to retry the facts under the Court's
advisory jurisdiction. 43 4 During this time, Congress was beginning to
assert its power to refuse payment in other cases. 435 When the Supreme
427. See id. at 499 ("[Tlhere is but one tribunal of the United States which may
direct this court to grant a new trial in a case adjudicated by this court . and that
tribunal is the Supreme Court of the United States.").
428. Id. at 500. Judge Green dissented from this portion of the opinion with Judge
Whaley concurring in such dissent. See id. at 502-07. Judge Green's dissent reasoned:
If other findings are made we will then have the case with two findings of
fact. As the former findings were part of the judgment, it seems clear to me
that the requirement to make new findings in the case not only conflicts with
the judgment heretofore rendered, but overrules it and sets it aside. I think it
clear that an act which has such an effect is unconstitutuonal.
Id. at 506.
429. Id. at 499-501.
430. Id. at 500.
431. Id. at 449.
432. Id. at 502.
433. Id. at 500 ("The act [i.e., Glass Compromise] is in its essence legislation respecting
an appropriation for the payment of a valid existing final judgment of this court, an
ancillary proceeding of a legislative body indispensable under the Constitution, apart from
judicial proceedings, to liquidate final judgments against the United States .... ").
434. Id. at 501 ("[Wle do not believe Congress intended to remand a case, but, on
the contrary, was seeking to ascertain certain facts with respect to appropriating public
funds of the United States, and no other purpose, a separate and distinct law concerned
only with legislation and not with judicial action.").
435. In 1931, the Court of Claims rendered judgment in favor of the claimant in the
case of Dalton v. United States, 71 Ct. Cl. 421 (1931). Congressman Wood of Indiana
argued that neither the Pocono Pines I judgment nor the Dalton judgment ought to be
paid so long as Congress questioned the appropriateness of the Court of Claims's dis-
position. He said, "[I]t is time we called a halt on this court by reversing some of its
decisions." 75 Cong. Rec. 1306-07 (1932). This position was strongly protested by Dalton's
attorneys who argued that Congress had no legal or moral right to repudiate a final
judgment of the Court of Claims. Id. at 3358-61.
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Court failed to halt the Court of Claims from proceeding to retry the
facts in Pocono Pines III (1932),436 the breakdown in the accommodation
between congressional payment and judicial non-enforceability became
complete. This breakdown, however, was to help force a further revision
in theory.
3. Breakdown- Theory
During the first third of the twentieth century, the theory supporting
the "hybrid model" also began to break down. As noted, the Supreme
Court used the sovereign immunity doctrine in the post-Civil War period
in order to reconcile the partial transfer of claims jurisdiction from
Congress to the courts with the judiciary's seemingly complete Article
III jurisdiction over "controversies to which the United States shall be
a party. '43 7 As late as 1902, the Supreme Court, in Minnesota v.
Hitchcock, stated that under this clause it is "a matter of indifference
whether the United States is a party plaintiff or defendant. ' 438  The
Supreme Court explained the relationship between the sovereign immunity
doctrine and the federal court's Article III jurisdiction by stating that
"the United States as a government may not be sued without its consent,
yet with its consent it may be sued, and the judicial power of the
United States extends to such a controversy. Indeed, the whole juris-
diction of the Court of Claims rests upon this proposition. '439 Thus,
at the turn of the century, the Supreme Court could still characterize
the Court of Claims as simply an Article III court exercising Article
III powers to the extent sovereign immunity had been waived." 0 However,
by 1933, both the sovereign immunity doctrine and the Article III basis
for the "hybrid model" were under heavy attack.
The concept of sovereign immunity had its critics -both at the be-
ginning of the republic 44' and after the Civil War. 4 2 Following World
436. On March 14, 1932, the Supreme Court denied a request to permit a writ of
mandamus or prohibition to be filed to halt further proceedings in the Court of Claims.
See Ex parte Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co., 285 U.S. 526, 52 S. Ct. 392 (1932).
Thus, in Pocono Pines III the Court of Claims retried the matter as a Congressional
"reference case," found that the fire did not originate from the faulty wiring of the hotel
company as argued by the government, and reaffirmed, in effect, its prior judgment
against the government. See 76 Ct. Cl. 334 (1932). These conclusions were reported back
to Congress. See 76 Cong. Rec. 40, 60 (1932).
437. See supra notes 340-65 and accompanying' text.
438. 185 U.S. 373, 384 (1902).
439. Id. at 386. See also Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331, 342 (1907).
440. The Supreme Court continued to characterize the Court of Claims as an Article
III court as late as 1924. See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
441. For example, James Wilson of Pennsylvania not only opposed the sovereign
immunity concept in 1793 at the time of Chisholm v. Georgia, see 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at
461, but also before the adoption of the Constitution as well, see 1 J. McMaster & F.
Stone, supra note 86, at 356.
442. See Martindale, The State and Its Creditors, 7 So. L. Rev. 544 (1881); Davie,
supra note 365; Freund, supra note 363.
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War I and throughout the 1920's, however, scholarly criticism greatly
intensified, often in conjunction with calls for the abolition of tort
immunity.443 In 1921 Dr. Ludwik Ehrlich concluded that the thirteenth-
century statement by Bracton that "the king can do no wrong" simply
meant "the the king must not, was not allowed, not entitled, to do
wrong; his acts, if against the law, were not legal acts, but iniuriae,
wrongs." ' 444 Moreover, "it was the king's duty to redress wrongs done
by himself or on his behalf." 445 The view that early kings-at least in
theory-were subject to the law was also expressed by Professor Hold-
sworth of Oxford University in 1926.46 This understanding was directly
contrary to the eighteenth century beliefs of Blackstone-whose Com-
mentaries were particularly influential in the early American republic 447-
who had argued that neither the king nor his ministers could do wrong
"because [English law] feels itself incapable of furnishing any adequate
remedy. ' 448 This led Professor Borchard of Yale to charge that the
sovereign immunity doctrine "rests upon a historical error"" 9 and that
it was inconsistent with the rule of law. 450 During the 1920's, Congress
itself found it necessary to respond to the growing popular and scholarly
criticism by enacting limited administrative relief for tort claims.4 5 By
443. See, e.g., R. Watkins, supra note 140; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort
(pts. 1-6), 34 Yale L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925), 36 Yale L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-1927);
Laski, The Responsibility of the State in England, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 447 (1918); Maguire,
State Liability for Tort, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 20 (1916).
444. See L. Ehrlich, Proceedings Against the Crown 42 (1921).
445. Id. at 43.
446. 9 W. Holdsworth, supra note 43, at 10 ("But we have seen that it was well
recognized in the thirteenth century and later that the king was subject to the law; and
that, though ordinary writs did not lie against him in his court, he was morally bound
to do the same justice to his subjects as they could be compelled to do to one another.
Indeed, as we have seen, there were many, including perhaps Bracton, who thought that
the highest court of the realm-the assembly of the baronage-ought to have jurisdiction
over him.") (footnotes omitted).
447. See Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of
Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 731 (1976). Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 429-50 (1793), was heavily influenced by Blackstone's
views on sovereignty. Nolan, supra, at 756-57. Blackstone's views were echoed by other
early commentators. See, e.g., J. Chitty, Prerogatives of the Crown 5 (1820).
448. 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 254-55 (S. Tucker ed. 1803). See also Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1963).
449. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort-A Proposed Statutory Reform,
11 A.B.A.J. 495, 496 (1925).
450. Professor Edward M. Borchard of Yale, probably the leading critic of the sovereign
immunity doctrine during this period, stated that
[ihf self-government has any meaning, it signifies community submission to legal
processes, as evidenced by the Constitution. Community agreement to be bound
by rules of law or to submit legal issues to judicial determination, is an adequate
assurance of the reign of law, without insisting on the "command" of a Superior
Being.
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (pt. 5), 36 Yale L.J. 757, 800 (1927).
451. In 1922, Congress enacted legislation allowing department heads to determine
negligence claims not exceeding $1,000. Act of Dec. 28, 1922, ch. 17, 42 Stat. 1066 (1922).
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the early 1930's, the policy of governmental immunity was under "a
continuous fire of adverse criticism from commentators. '452
Thus, the theoretical foundation of the "hybrid model" was being
pulled apart from two sides. The resurgence of "legislative model"
attitudes in Congress had already undermined the Article III status of
the Court of Claims by the 1910 increase in its advisory jurisdiction.4 3
Moreover, Congress's 1931 "remand" of the Pocono Pines I judgment45 4
raised even more difficult questions about the nature of the Court of
Claims's "judicial" (i.e., non-advisory) powers. Was Congress truly
bound to follow them?45 Meanwhile, proponents of the "judicial model"
had seriously eroded the persuasiveness of the sovereign immunity doc-
trine as a credible explanation for the gradual transfer of claims juris-
diction from Congress to the courts. 45 6
In 1933, the Supreme Court confronted these problems in Williams
v. United States.4 7 The question presented was whether the Article III
prohibition against diminution of judicial salaries while in office pre-
vented the salaries of judges of the Court of Claims from being reduced
from $12,500 to $10,000 per year. The Supreme Court, relying heavily
on its dictum in Bakelite, held that since the Court of Claims was an
Article I court it was not protected by the Article III prohibition against
reduction of salaries. Thus, the salary cut was permissible.
The Supreme Court, however, used Williams to announce a sub-
stantially new constitutional theory regarding claims. In essence, the
Court stated that the power to determine money claims was basically
a legislative "function which belongs primarily to Congress as an incident
of its power to pay the debts of the United States. ' 458 Congress could
exercise this power itself or delegate this power to either the executive 459
or judicial branches.4 60 The Court then repudiated its previous position
In 1925, Congress debated, without resolution, proposals to further extend government
liability for tort. 67 Cong. Rec. 1086-1110 (1926). In 1929, Congress passed significant
legislation authorizing tort claims against the United States for up to $50,000 for property
and for up to $7,500 for personal injuries. 70 Cong. Rec. 4858, 5272 (1929). This proposal
was given a pocket veto by President Coolidge apparently because the bill designated the
Comptroller General, rather than the Attorney General, to defend the government's
position. See McGuire, Tort Claims Against the United States, 19 Geo. L.J. 133, 134-35
(1931); see also H.R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1942).
452. Note, Administrative Phases of State Responsibility, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 432, 432-
33 (1930).
453. See supra notes 373-402 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 403-36 and accompanying text.
455. Note, The Court of Claims: Judicial Power and Congressional Review, 46 Harv.
L. Rev. 677, 677 (1932-1933).
456. See supra notes 411-52 and accompanying text.
457. 289 U.S. 553, 53 S. Ct. 751 (1933).
458. Id. at 569, 53 S. Ct. at 756.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 565, 53 S. Ct. at 754.
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in Minnesota v. Hitchcock and held that the federal judiciary had no
independent constitutional basis for jurisdiction under the Article III
clause referring to "controversies to which the United States shall be a
party." ' 46' Relying on the presumed intentions of the Framers, the Court
stated that this phrase must be read to refer only to cases in which the
United States is a party plaintiff or petitioner. 462 Accordingly, the "ju-
dicial" power delegated to the Court of Claims was really an Article
I judicial power and not an Article III judicial power at all!
By this reformulation, the Supreme Court was clearly laying the
basis for a theory which could explain both the ability of Congress to
refuse to appropriate funds to pay a judgment and the inability of the
judiciary to enforce it. Conceptually, it also tended to transform the
non-suability of the government from an ancient question of immunity
of the sovereign into a modern question of delegation of Article I
authority. With this change, the Court appeared to be both anticipating
and acquiescing in a resurgence of congressional activism in revising
judgments involving claims. In a theoretical sense, the Supreme Court
in Williams appeared to be willing to give Congress what it had refused
to do in 1792 in Hayburn's Case 163 and in 1865 in Gordon v. United
States464-that is, to give Congress an advisory court.
Thus, in Williams the theoretical basis for the "hybrid model" was
dismantled. The Supreme Court eliminated the Article III basis for an
evolving "judicial model" as it cleared the way for Congress to build
a new system of claims determination-presumably within the context
of the "legislative model." However, by this time the attention of
Congress had shifted to broader issues as the country slipped deeper
into economic depression at home and global war abroad. During the
remainder of the 1930's, efforts in Congress either to assert greater
control over judgments465 or, conversely, to eliminate tort immunity466
went nowhere as Congress wrestled with more urgent domestic and
international problems. By 1939, the Supreme Court itself began to sense
that its prior doctrines might be out of step with "the expanding
conceptions of public morality regarding governmental responsibility."
4 67
461. Id. at 571-77, 53 S. Ct. at 756-59.
462. Id. at 577, 53 S. Ct. at 759.
463. See supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
464. See supra notes 271-79 and accompanying text.
465. In 1932, some members of Congress advocated greater congressional control over
judgments. See supra note 435. A bill introduced in the Senate to deprive the Court of
Claims of its power to render binding judgments never got out of committee, however.
S. 3625, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 75 Cong. Rec. 3808 (1932).
466. For a complete listing of all tort claims bills introduced in Congress during this
period, see Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 Geo.
L.J. 1, 2-3 nn.4-5 (1946).
467. See Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 306 U.S. 381, 396, 59 S. Ct. 516, 521 (1939).
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It had taken the Civil War to jolt Congress into abandoning the "leg-
islative model;" it would take World War II to play a similar role in
the demise of the "hybrid model." The Supreme Court in Williams,
however, poorly anticipated the approach Congress would take in build-
ing a new system of claims determination after the war.
III. THE "JUDICIAL MODEL"-WORLD WAR Il TO PRESENT
Since World War II, Congress has turned over to the federal judiciary
the responsibility for determining virtually all legal claims against the
United States. Congress's relinquishment of its historic practice was
necessitated by the press of more significant matters for its limited time
and attention. Nevertheless, Congress has retained its practice of con-
sidering moral claims. This section of the analysis traces: (A) the de-
velopment of the "judicial model" during the post-World War II era
when Congress adopted the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946,468 statutorily
declared the Court of Claims to be an Article III court in 1953,469 and
enacted the Automatic Payment of Judgments Act in 1956; 410 and (B)
the triumph of the "judicial model" when the Supreme Court re-es-
tablished an Article III basis for claims in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok in
1962 ' 47 and when Congress continued to permit virtually all legal claims
to be determined by the federal courts and repealed the $100,000 lim-
itation on the Automatic Payment of Judgments Act in 1977.
A. Development-Congress Relinquishes Control
1. Relinquishment- Tort Claims
On January 14, 1942, in a message to Congress, President Roosevelt
alluded to America's involvement in World War II, noted the fact that
over 2,000 claims bills were introduced in each Congress, and declared
that consideration of such claims was time consuming and expensive
for both Congress and the President.4 72 In a direct attack on Congress's
inability to resolve the problem, Roosevelt said:
As Congress knows, this question has been considered many
times before. During the past 20 years, Members of the Congress
468. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1947) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1983)).
469. Act of July 28, 1953, ch. 253, 67 Stat. 226 (1953).
470. Automatic Payment of Judgments Act, ch. 748, 70 Stat. 694 (1956).
471. 370 U.S. 530, 82 S. Ct. 1459 (1962).
472. H.R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1942). President Roosevelt stated
that "[diuring the last 3 Congresses, fully 6,300 private claim bills were introduced . .
. of which less than 20 percent became law. And of all the bills which I vetoed during
these Congresses, fully one-third was made up of private claim bills." Id.
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have frequently pointed out that the procedure for relief of tort
claims by special act is slow, expensive, and unfair both to the
Congress and to the claimant, and several attempts have been
made to enact legislation submitting all negligence claims to
administrative or judicial determination.
The question arises why the Congress and the President should
continue to devote so much time to the consideration and ap-
proval of these numerous individual cases.
47
1
Roosevelt urged Congress to grant jurisdiction to the federal district
courts to consider tort claims up to $7,500, with a right of appeal to
the Court of Claims. 474 Despite Roosevelt's support, many members of
Congress remained satisfied with congressional determination of tort
claims and deemed the proposal "highly dangerous to our Govern-
ment. ' 475 Such members apparently retained enough influence to prevent
passage until the end of the war.
By the end of World War II, a consensus arose that Congress-which
last reorganized in 1921-was badly in need of another reorganization.
Studies concluded that the traditional legislative machinery was no longer
competent to deal with the problems of the post-war world.4 7 6 A majority
of Congress came to share the view of Congressman Monroney of
Oklahoma, a principal advocate of reorganization, who argued that
Congress was struggling under a work load which had increased by
"geometric proportions" while "trying to do the job with tools so
absolutely obsolete and antiquated that 435 saints could not possibly
do with our present equipment and organization. '477 Senator LaFollette
of Wisconsin described the situation as "a grave constitutional crisis .
. . in which the fate of representative government itself is at stake.
' 47
1
In response to this crisis, Congress adopted the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946479 -a wide ranging package of reforms which regulated
lobbyists, consolidated Congress's committee structure, improved pro-
cedures for the appropriation of funds, strengthened Congress' oversight
ability over the Executive, and conserved Congress's time for the most
important policy-making matters. 48 0 One little-debated part of the reform
package, designed to save congressional time, was the transfer of most
tort claims from Congress to the federal district courts.
48 1
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 18.
476. S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1946).
477. 92 Cong. Rec. 10039 (1946).
478. Id. at 6344.
479. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
480. Id. See also S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-9 (1946).
481. See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, tit. IV (Federal Tort Claims
Act), 60 Stat. 812, 842-47 (1946). By 1946, approximately one-third of all bills introduced
1985]
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In this way, the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 was adopted as a
part of the larger reform measure. 482 The act conferred jurisdiction on
the federal district court to determine claims against the United States
on account of damages to property or personal injury caused by the
negligence or wrongful act of any employee of the government. 483 Al-
though excluding intentional torts and discretionary acts,484 the Act
imposed no monetary limit.4 85 Moreover, Congress banned the intro-
duction of private bills concerning claims which could be instituted under
the Federal Tort Claims Act. 486 Although this change was arguably long
overdue, a 1942 congressional study indicated that only a handful of
state legislatures had gone as far.4 8 7 Thus, after over a century of
acrimonious debate, Congress finally relinquished jurisdiction over most
tort claims in 1946, with little fanfare, as a part of a larger reform
package.
2. Relinquishment-Article III Status of Court of Claims
Before the adoption of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, the
Supreme Court had consistently adhered to its position in Williams that
the determination of claims against the United States was solely an
Article I power which Congress could exercise itself or delegate to other
judicial or non-judicial agencies.4 8 Under the Williams theory, the Court
and one-half of all laws adopted were private legislation. 95 Cong. Rec. A2901 (1949).
The purpose of transfering the determination of tort claims to the courts was to reduce
the volume of private legislation and to thereby save congressional time. S. Rep. No.
1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1946). Given the magnitude of the other changes, congres-
sional opponents of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 appeared to focus their
attention on other aspects of the legislation and dismissed title IV of the Act-relating
to tort claims-as "purely a legal matter." 92 Cong. Rec. 6464 (1946) (remarks of Sen.
Thomas).
482. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1947) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1983)).
483. Id. at 843-45.
484. The Federal Tort Claims Act expressly excluded "[any claim arising out of
assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." Id. at 846.
The act also excluded "[a]ny claim .. .based upon the exercise . ..or the failure to
exercise . . . a discretionary function . . . whether or not the discretion involved be
abused." Id. at 845.
485. For an excellent summary of the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act, see
Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 Geo. L.J. 1 (1946).
486. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812, 831 (1946).
487. H.R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1942) (The states mentioned were
New York, California, Illinois, and Arizona.). See also Nutting, Legislative Practice
Regarding Tort Claims Against the State, 4 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1939); Shumate, Tort Claims
Against State Governments, 9 Law & Contemp. Probs. 242 (1942).
488. For example, in United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 61 S. Ct. 767 (1941),
the Supreme Court continued to state that the "Court of Claims is a legislative, not a
constitutional court. Its judicial power is derived not from the Judiciary Article of the
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of Claims was a legislative court and the Federal Tort Claims Act,
which conferred primary jurisdiction on the district courts, could be
explained as a delegation of Article I judicial power to the district courts
similar to the concurrent claims jurisdiction conferred on such courts
under the Tlpcker Act.4s9 Nevertheless, in 1949 in National Mutual In-
surance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 490 only three justices of the
Supreme Court continued to adhere to the strict Williams view that
claims against the United States were solely an Article I power. 491 The
other justices-perhaps sensing a fundamental shift away from the "leg-
islative model" implied in the conferral of tort claims jurisdiction on
the district courts-suggested that such claims were also within Article
III either as "controversies to which the United States shall be a party ' 492
or as cases "arising under . . . the laws of the United States.'' 493 This
theoretical retreat from Williams was not to go unnoticed by Congress.
In 1953 Congress considered bills which sought to declare the Court
of Claims an Article III court. 494 The purposes of the bills were to help
protect the independence of the Court of Claims and to permit the
assignment of district and circuit judges to assist the judges of the Court
of Claims when necessary. 495 An examination of the congressional debates
clearly reveals that Congress understood that the Supreme Court's divided
Constitution, but from the Congressional power 'to pay the debts . . . of the United
States,' which it is free to exercise through judicial as well as non-judicial agencies." Id.
at 587, 61 S. Ct. at 770 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1). See also Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321, 54 S. Ct. 745, 747 (1934); Pope v. United States, 323
U.S. 1, 9, 65 S. Ct. 16, 21 (1944).
489. See supra notes 457-62 and accompanying text.
490. 337 U.S. 582, 69 S. Ct. 1173 (1944). This case involved whether or not Congress
could confer jurisdiction on federal courts to determine actions brought by citizens of
the District of Columbia against citizens of one of the States. A divided Court held the
statute constitutional for different reasons.
491. Justices Jackson, Black, and Burton adhered to the view that jurisdiction to
determine claims was solely an Article I power with no Article III basis. Id. at 592-94,
69 S. Ct. at 1177-79 (plurality opinion).
492. Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Rutledge, Douglas, and Murphy appeared to
endorse this view in their concurring opinion. Id. at 609-10, 69 S. Ct. at 1186-87 (Vinson,
C.J., Rutledge, Douglas, Murphy, JJ., concurring). Likewise, Justices Frankfurter and
Reed said in dissent that the Court's discussion in Williams regarding "controversies to
which the United States shall be a party" was "dictum." Id. at 640 n.20, 641-42 n.21,
69 S. Ct. at 1207-08 nn.20-21 (dissenting opinion).
493. Justices Frankfurter and Reed, who dissented from the decision's conclusion,
took the position that suits involving claims against the government were within the federal
question jurisdiction of Article II. Id. at 648-49, 69 S. Ct. at 1196-97 (Frankfurter, Reed,
JJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Vinson, and Justices Rutledge, Douglas, and Murphy ex-
pressly agreed with this portion of Frankfurter and Reed's dissenting opinion. Id. at 610,
69 S. Ct. at 1187 (Vinson, C.J., Rutledge, Douglas, Murphy, JJ., concurring).
494. S. 1349, 83 Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); H.R. 1070, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
495. H.R. Rep. No. 695, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953); S. Rep. No. 261, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess. 2-3 (1953).
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Tidewater opinion of 1949-which suggested an Article III basis for
claims-had opened the door for a possible congressional reversal of
Williams.4 96 Most members of Congress came to agree with Senator
Laner of North Dakota that Williams was wrongly decided and that
"[tihis measure would bring about what is believed to be the original
intent of Congress when the Court of Claims was created. ' 497 Critics
of the bill, such as Senator Gore of Tennessee, asked how Congress
could declare the Court of Claims to be an Article III court and at the
same time continue to require it to render advisory opinions.4 9a Not-
withstanding this concern, the bill was adopted.4 99 Thus, by 1953 Con-
gress was willing to relinquish voluntarily, at least in word if not totally
in deed, constitutional hegemony over the Court of Claims.
3. Relinquishment-Automatic Payment of Most Judgments
Despite the 1953 congressional declaration, two factors which histor-
ically had confused the constitutional status of the Court of Claims
remained unchanged: (1) its advisory jurisdiction,: ° and (2) its inability
to enforce its judgments if Congress refused to appropriate the necessary
funds. °1 Although Congress continued to request advisory opinions even
after its 1953 declaration 0 2 it took action three years later which sub-
stantially alleviated the second concern.
In 1956, Congress adopted the Automatic Payment of Judgments Act
which provided a continuing appropriation for all judgments certified
by the Comptroller General not in excess of $100,000.503 The purpose
of the legislation was to eliminate delays in the payment of judgments
and the additional interest costs incurred as a result of such delays.5 04
Although subject to the $100,000 limit, it was estimated at the time
that it would cover 98 percent of all judgments. 0 5 This represented an
historic shift in congressional attitudes. As noted, after the Civil War
Congress refused to provide for either a continuing appropriation for
the payment of judgments or the enforcement of judgments through
496. See 99 Cong. Rec. 8943-44 (1953).
497. Id. at 5296.
498. Id. at 8944.
499. Act of July 28, 1953, ch. 253, 67 Stat. 226 (1953).
500. Although the 1953 statute repealed the provision relating to executive reference
jurisdiction, see Act of July 28, 1953, § 8, 67 Stat. 226, 226 (1953), it left intact jurisdiction
over congressional reference cases. Note, The Constitutional Status of the Court of Claims,
68 Harv. L. Rev. 527, 531-34 (1955).
501. See Note, supra note 500, at 530-31.
502. See, e.g., Waring v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 336 (1954); Gorham v. United
States, 127 Ct. Cl. 750 (1954); Braund v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 691 (1955).
503. Automatic Payment of Judgments Act, ch. 748, 70 Stat. 694 (1956).
504. H.R. Rep. No. 2638, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1956).
505. Id.
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execution. 06 Instead, Congress chose to appropriate funds annually on
a lump sum basis-at first prospectively and then ultimately retrospec-
tively after 1895.0 7 Although Congress almost always paid, 0 significant
questions were raised over the constitutional status of such judgments
if, as in the Pocono Pines litigation, Congress chose not to pay a certain
judgment. 0 9 The 1956 legislation did much to minimize this concern.
Thus, following World War II, Congress enacted three significant
pieces of legislation: the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, the statutory
declaration that the Court of Claims was an Article III court in 1953,
and the Automatic Payment of Judgments Act in 1956. There was little
doubt that Congress, which now had weightier matters on its agenda,
was moving toward a "judicial model" of claims determination in which
private claims would be finally determined by the federal judiciary
pursuant to the rule of law, rather than by Congress pursuant to the
political process. During this period, the states were also gradually
moving away from the "legislative model." 510 Despite favorable indi-
cations,5"' the question became how the Supreme Court would react to
this congressional change in direction given its 1933 opinion in Williams
and its divided 1949 opinion in National Insurance Co.
B. Triumph-Toward A "Judicial Model"
1. A "Judicial Model" of Article III
In 1962, the Supreme Court reexamined the constitutional status of
the Court of Claims in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok.12 This case involved
the validity of a federal district court judgment rendered by a judge of
the Court of Claims who was sitting pursuant to a temporary assignment
506. See supra notes 256-58, 281-84 and accompanying text.
507. See supra notes 290-305 and accompanying text.
508. See supra note 306.
509. See supra note 455 and accompanying text.
510. The state reforms were gradual and appeared to favor administrative, rather than
judicial, methods of determining claims. See generally Note, Administration of Claims
Against the Sovereign-A Survey of State Techniques, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 506 (1955).
Nevertheless, there were isolated signs that the sovereign immunity doctrine was no longer
beyond judicial criticism. For example, in 1953 Justice Carter of the California Supreme
Court, in a dissenting opinion, stated that "[tihe entire doctrine of governmental immunity
rests upon a rotten foundation, and professors, writers and liberal-minded judges are of
the view that it should be placed in the judicial garbage can where it belongs." Talley
v. Northern San Diego Hosp. Dist., 41 Cal. 2d 33, 43, 257 P.2d 22, 28 (1953). See also
Boxberger v. State Highway Dep't, 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952); Note, The
Sovereign Immunity of the States: The Doctrine and Some of Its Recent Developments,
40 Minn. L. Rev. 234 (1956).
511. On February 23, 1954, Chief Justice Earl Warren assigned a federal circuit judge
to temporarily serve as a judge of the Court of Claims pursuant to the act which had
declared the Court of Claims an Article III court. 127 Ct. Cl. xxi (1954).
512. 370 U.S. 530, 82 S. Ct. 1459 (1962).
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from the Chief Justice. The issue was whether a Court of Claims judge
was an Article III judge capable of accepting such an assignment. The
case, therefore, turned on the effect of Congress's 1953 statutory dec-
laration on the Supreme Court's 1933 decision in Williams. On a five
to two vote," 3 the Supreme Court sustained both the judgment and the
Article III status of the Court of Claims. However, the five justices
voting to sustain split into two groups.
The plurality opinion was written by Justice Harlan and joined by
Justices Brennan and Stewart. 1 14 After tracing the history of the Court
of Claims, Justice Harlan concluded that the Supreme Court had con-
sistently assumed the Article III status of the Court of Claims during
the post-Civil War period5 5 and that its opinions in Bakelite and Williams
were wrongly decided. 5 6 In particular, Harlan disagreed with the concept
in Williams that "controversies to which the United States shall be a
party" only applied to situations where the United States was a party
plaintiff.5 7 Relying on cases such as its 1902 opinion in Minnesota v.
Hitchcock, Harlan noted that the Williams analysis was directly contrary
to earlier precedent." 8 In a return to the "hybrid model" theory, Harlan
stated that this Article III provision applied to both party plaintiff and
party defendant status and "once . . . consent is given, . . . there
remains no barrier to justiciability."51 9 Next, Harlan addressed the issue
raised by Justice Taney in his "lost opinion "520-i.e., whether enforce-
ability was essential to Article III jurisdiction. 2' After noting Congress's
1956 adoption of the Automatic Payment of Judgment Acts for awards
up to $100,000522 and Congress's near perfect payment history even
before this enactment, 2 Harlan observed that this created a situation
"surely more favorable to prevailing parties than that obtaining in private
litigation. '524 Under these circumstances, Harlan concluded that this
''may well make us doubt whether the capacity to enforce a judgment
513. A dissenting opinion was written by Justice Douglas and joined by Justice Black
who continued to adhere to the Court's prior position in Bakelite and Williams that the
Court of Claims was an Article I court. Id. at 589-606, 82 S. Ct. at 1493-1502. Justices
Frankfurter and White did not participate in the Court's decision. Id. at 585, 82 S. Ct.
at 1491.
514. Id. at 531-85, 82 S. Ct. at 1463-91.
515. See id. at 552-58, 82 S. Ct. at 1474-77.
516. See id. at 562-68, 82 S. Ct. at 1479-82.
517. Id. at 562, 82 S. Ct. at 1479.
518. Id. at 564, 82 S. Ct. at 1480.
519. Id.
520. See supra note 302.
521. Zdanok, 370 U.S. at 568-71, 82 S. Ct. at 1482-84.
522. Id. at 569, 82 S. Ct. at 1482.
523. Id. at 570, 82 S. Ct. at 1483 ("A study concluded in 1933 found only 15 instances
in 70 years when Congress had refused to pay a judgment.").
524. Id.
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is always indispensable for the exercise of judicial power. 5 25 Having
concluded that the Court of Claims was an Article III court, Harlan
assumed that advisory jurisdiction inconsistent with this status would
no longer be entertained. 26 Thus, the plurality's position was that the
1953 statutory declaration merely confirmed the existing Article III status
of the Court of Claims.
A concurring opinion was written by Justice Clark and joined by
Chief Justice Warren. 27 Justice Clark objected to the "unnecessary
overruling" of Bakelite and Williams by the plurality.5 21 Clark argued
that the two prior cases were compelled by the substantial advisory
jurisdiction which the Court of Claims exercised during that period of
its history.5 29 Since that time, however, Congress had reduced the number
of congressional reference cases to approximately ten a year, and prac-
tically all the court's jurisdiction was now comprised of Article III
cases. 30 Given this significant change in circumstances, Justice Clark
believed that the Supreme Court could give effect to the 1953 statutory
declaration without overruling its previous opinions.5 3 1 Given its Article
III status, Clark also believed the Court of Claims should henceforth
decline to render advisory opinions.
32
Thus, after the Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, the Article III basis for claims was once again firmly established.
The Article III judges of the Court of Claims stopped responding to
congressional reference cases, and in 1966 Congress was forced to confer
this responsibility on the non-Article III trial commissioners of the Court
of Claims. 33 The. Supreme Court made a major readjustment and took
525. Id. Most legal scholars would agree with Harlan that an official sanction is not
always an essential criterion for the existence of a body of legal rules so long as there
is a reasonably high degree of compliance. See generally E. Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence
269-76 (rev. ed. 1974).
526. Zdanok, 370 U.S. at 582-83, 82 S. Ct. at 1489-90.
527. Id. at 585-89, 82 S. Ct. at 1491-93.
528. Id. at 585, 82 S. Ct. at 1491. It appears, however, that Harlan and the plurality
were concerned that a theory that admitted that a change in the constitutional status of
the Court of Claims occurred in 1953 would also require new presidential appointments
for all the positions on the Court of Claims. Id. at 589, 82 S. Ct. at 1493.
529. Id. at 586, 82 S. Ct. at 1491.
530. Id. at 586-87, 82 S. Ct. at 1491-92.
531. Id. 585-87, 82 S. Ct. at 1491-92.
532. Id. at 587, 82 S. Ct. at 1492 ("In my view the Court of Claims, if and when
such a reference occurs, should with due deference advise the Congress, as this Court
advised the President 169 years ago, that it cannot render advisory opinions.").
533. In 1966, Congress conferred the responsibility for determining congressional ref-
erence cases upon the chief commissioner of the trial division of the Court of Claims.
Act of October 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-681, 80 Stat. 958 (1966); Glosser, Congressional
Reference Cases in the United States Court of Claims: A Historical and Current Perspective,
25 Am. U.L. Rev. 595 (1976). This was constitutionally permissible because the com-
missioners (trial judges) of the Court of Claims were not Article III judges. See 2 W.
Cowen, P. Nichols & M. Bennett, supra note 88, at 63.
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a big step toward establishing an Article III basis for a "judicial model"
of claims determination.
2. A "Judicial Model" of Claims Jurisdiction
In 1962 in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, the Supreme Court was careful
to state that the exercise of Article III jurisdiction was conditioned upon
a waiver of sovereign immunity. 3 4 Moreover, in 1963 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the validity of this doctrine in two cases involving land. 35
The Supreme Court's position was contrary to the views of many of
the doctrine's critics53 6 and in sharp contrast to the decisions of many
state courts which judicially abolished or abridged the sovereign immunity
doctrine during the late 1950's and early 1960's.13 7
By this time, however, the transfer of claims from Congress to the
courts had been so extensive that it had alleviated much of the pressure
at the federal level for judicial abolition of the doctrine. As previously
indicated, aggrieved individuals could bring damage actions against the
federal government for contract claims since the reorganization of the
Court of Claims in 1863,538 and for most other common legal claims
(e.g., admiralty, tax, pay, and "taking" cases) since the adoption of
the Tucker Act in 1887 39-the significant exception, of course, being
for those claims "sounding in tort. 3 540 However, Congress had subse-
quently waived much of its tort immunity over the years as follows:
patent claims in 1910,14' negligence claims in 1946,542 and copyright claims
in 1960. 41 Such extensive legislative waiver of immunity was not the
534. 370 U.S. at 564, 82 S. Ct. at 1480.
535. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 83 S. Ct. 999 (1963); Hawaii v. Gordon, 373
U.S. 57, 83 S. Ct. 1052 (1963).
536. Criticism of the sovereign immunity doctrine continued even after the adoption
of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946. See, e.g., Block, Suits Against Government
Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1060 (1946); Carrow,
Sovereign Immunity in Administrative Law: A New Diagnosis, 9 J. Pub. L. 1 (1960);
Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev.
1 (1963); Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 La. L.
Rev. 476 (1953); Walkup, Immunity of the State From Suit By Its Citizens-Toward A
More Enlightened Concept, 36 Geo. L.J. 310 (1948).
537. For a list of the state court decisions from this period, see Note, The Role of
the Courts in Abolishing Governmental Immunity, 1964 Duke L.J. 888, 890 n.12.
538. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765 (1863).
539. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887).
540. Id.
541. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 (1911).
542. Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1947) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 et seq. (1983)). The waiver of immunity for negligence,
however, is significantly qualified by the "discretionary function" exemption, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(a) (1983). Compare Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S. Ct. 956 (1953)
(negligence at "planning" level still immune) with Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 61, 76 S. Ct. 122 (1955) (negligence at "operational" level not immune).
543. Act of Sept. 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-726, 74 Stat. 855 (1960).
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case in many states where reform was prompted only after the judicial
abolition or abridgment of the sovereign immunity doctrine. 54 Thus, the
sovereign immunity doctrine remained the federal rule in theory largely
because immunity had become the decided exception in practice. More-
over, the Supreme Court was to devise other means to address the last,
significant pocket of federal immunity154 -the area of intentional torts.
During the 1970's, the Supreme Court responded to the government's
intentional tort immunity by making federal officials, rather than the
government itself, increasingly liable for their own tortious acts. 546 This
was accomplished in two ways. First, in 1971 the Supreme Court held
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents5 47 that federal nar-
cotics agents who violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures could be held personally liable for
damages in a suit brought directly under the Fourth Amendment itself-
no further statutory authorization by Congress was necessary.5 4 Fol-
lowing Bivens, the federal courts expanded the case's rationale to include
544. See Note, supra note 537, at 890-92.
545. After the adoption of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, it was suggested
that Congress should reassess its preservation of immunity for intentional torts. See
Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the United States and its Officials, 70 Harv.
L. Rev. 827, 891 (1957). Congress, however, preferred to determine such claims itself
pursuant to its own internal procedures. See generally Gellhorn & Lauer, Congressional
Settlement of Tort Claims Against the United States, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1955).
Nevertheless, during the 1970's Congress waived significant immunity in the non-claims
area. In 1972 Congress enacted legislation to permit quiet title actions to be brought
against the United States. Act of Oct. 25, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-562, 86 Stat. 1176
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(f), 1402(d), 2409(a) (1983)). And in 1976 Congress amended
the Administrative Procedure Act to permit review of administrative action in suits for
relief other than monetary relief. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat.
2721 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-703 (1983)).
546. In theory, federal personnel were personally answerable under state law for torts
committed while engaging in official duties. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652, 83
S. Ct. 1441, 1445 (1962). In reality, however, certain privileges and immunities had
effectively shielded them from most tort liability. See Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort
Liability, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 201 (1956). In particular, federal personnel exercising discre-
tionary authority could invoke an absolute federal immunity. Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S.
564, 574, 79 S. Ct. 1335, 1341 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498-99, 16 S.
Ct. 631, 637 (1895). For a concise summary of the law of public officer liability as it
existed during the early 1970's, see W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 132,
at 987-92 (4th ed. 1971).
547. 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971).
548. In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan addressed the lack of a statute authorizing
a damage remedy as follows:
[Ilt would be at least anomalous to conclude that the federal judiciary-while
competent to choose among the range of traditional judicial remedies to im-
plement statutory and common-law policies ... is powerless to accord a damages
remedy to vindicate social policies which, by virtue of their inclusion in the
Constitution, are aimed predominantly at restraining the Government as an
instrument of the popular will.
Id. at 403-04, 91 S. Ct. at 2008.
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a wide range of constitutional infringements including violations of due
process, freedoms of speech and assembly, and equal protection.149 Thus,
after Bivens, federal officials could be held personally liable for com-
mitting a wide variety of constitutional wrongs directly under the Con-
stitution itself."0 Second, in 1974 the Supreme Court held in Scheuer
v. Rhodes"' that Ohio officials who made critical decisions that cul-
minated in the fatal shooting of three students at Kent State University
in 1970 could assert only a conditional, rather than an absolute, immunity
in civil rights damage suits filed against them in their personal capacity.
Thus, an executive official could no longer claim a broad, absolute
immunity for all his discretionary acts.5 5 2 The official could claim official
immunity only if he acted in good faith and upon a reasonable belief
in the validity of his acts. 53 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court
applied the conditional immunity doctrine to constitutional violations by
federal officials as well 5 4 The effect of the Bivens and Scheuer line of
case law was to expand substantially the personal responsibility of federal
officials for their own tortious acts by increasing their liability for
constitutioual wrongs and by decreasing the scope of their personal
549. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979); Lehmann, Bivens
and Its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed
by Government Officials, 4 Hastings Const. L.Q. 531, 566-572 (1977). For an excellent
article regarding the scope of recoverable damages, see Love, Damages: A Remedy for
the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1242 (1979).
550. Ironically, Congress had in 1871 imposed personal liability on state and local
governmental personnel for constitutional violations. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1,
17 Stat. 13 (1873) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1983)).
551. 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974).
552. Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 574, 79 S. Ct. 1335, 1341 (1959); Spalding v.
Vilco, 161 U.S. 483, 498-99, 16 S. Ct. 631, 637 (1895). In Scheuer, Chief Justice Burger
described the relationship between the sovereign immunity of the government and the
personal immunity of the official as follows:
The concept of the immunity of government officers from personal liability
springs from the same root considerations that generated the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. While the latter doctrine - that the 'King can do no wrong' - did
not protect all government officers from personal liability, the common law
soon recognized the necessity of permitting officials to perform their official
functions free from the threat of suits for personal liability.
416 U.S. at 239, 94 S. Ct. at 1688.
553. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247-48, 94 S. Ct. at 1692 ("It is the existence of
reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances,
coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive
officers for acts performed in course of official conduct."). Subsequent Supreme Court
cases defining the qualified immunity defense include: Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
95 S. Ct. 992 (1975); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978); Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982); Davis v. Scherer, 104 S. Ct. 3012
(1984).
554. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
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immunity." 5 The Supreme Court itself stated that this expansion was
prompted by the need to deter official wrongdoing and to provide victims
with relief given the federal government's retained tort immunity.5" 6
The Supreme Court's actions, however, resulted in pressure on Con-
gress to waive the government's remaining tort immunity." 7 After Bivens,
many felt it was unfair and inhibiting to make federal employees bear
the brunt of Bivens liability entirely themselves. 558 A Senate report de-
scribed another disparity as follows: "under the Federal Tort Claims
Act a Federal mail truck driver creates direct federal liability if he
negligently runs down a citizen ...but the Federal Government is held
harmless if a federal narcotics agent intentionally assaults that same
citizen in the course of an illegal 'no-knock' raid." 59 In response to
this specific inequity, Congress amended the Federal Tort Claims Act
in 1974 and waived the government's immunity with regard to the
following torts committed by its investigative and law enforcement per-
sonnel: assault, battery, false imprisonment, abuse of process, and ma-
licious prosecution.5 60 However, Congress rejected proposals for a general
waiver of its tort immunity for all federal personnel,56 preferring to
continue to consider such claims itself pursuant to its own procedures. 62
Nevertheless, bills proposing a more extensive waiver have continued to
be introduced in subsequent Congresses. 6
Thus, during the 1970's the Supreme Court continued to adhere to
the sovereign immunity doctrine despite its widespread abridgment by
state courts.564 However, by significantly increasing the personal liability
555. For an excellent discussion of the blessings and problems created by this expansion,
see Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability,. 77 Colum. L. Rev.
1175 (1977).
556. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 504-06, 98 S. Ct. at 2909-10.
557. Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts
Amendment: An Interpretive Analysis, 54 N.C.L. Rev. 497 (1976).
558. Id. at 512.
559. S. Rep. No. 588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2789, 2791.
560. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982) (effective March 16, 1974).
561. See Burger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 557, at 510-17.
562. For a good article describing congressional procedures for determining claims and
the use after 1966 of Commissioners of the Court of Claims to determine factual questions,
see Bennett, Private Claims Acts and Congressional References, 9 U.S.A.F. JAG L. Rev.
9 (Nov.-Dec. 1967).
563. See, e.g., S. 2117, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 9219, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977); H.R. 2659, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 24, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981);
S. 633, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See also Bell, Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 16 Harv. J. Legis. 1 (1979); Castro, Government Liability for Consti-
tutional Torts: Proposals to Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act, 49 Tenn. L. Rev. 201
(1982); Dolan, Constitutional Torts and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 14 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 281 (1979).
564. See, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S. Ct. 948, 953-54
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of federal officials for their own intentional torts, the Supreme Court
had chosen to prod, rather than to coerce, Congress toward completing
a "judicial model" of claims jurisdiction.
3. A "Judicial Model" of Enforcement
During the late 1970's and early 1980's, the focus of development
shifted from immunity to the payment of judgments. Ever since Lord
Sommers's classic argument in 1700 in the Case of the Bankers, 65 it
had been regarded as axiomatic that a judicial power to dispurse funds
directly from the public treasury was incompatible with a legislative
power to allocate scarce resources to the most pressing public and private
needs. 66 By the time of American independence, it was already a well-
established English practice to submit money judgments against the crown
to Parliament for payment. 67 This received wisdom was never seriously
questioned by either Congress or the federal courts. Thus, Congress had
historically refused to enact a continuing appropriation for the payment
of all judgments,5 6 and the federal courts had refused to enforce payment
without a specific appropriation. 69 As late as 1974, the Supreme Court
continued to state that- a judgment creditor must 'rely on the good
faith of the United States"' for payment. 70 State courts had long adopted
a similar position for judgments against a state.5 71
(1976). By 1977, 31 state courts had abolished or abridged sovereign immunity by judicial
action. K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies § 25.00 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
565. 14 How. St. Trials 1 (1816).
566. In 1700 Lord Sommers maintained in the Case of the Bankers that a judicial
power to disperse funds from the treasury was incompatible with Parliament's newly
acquired power of the purse. His classic argument was stated as follows:
The barons of the Exchequer [when sitting as a court of justice] cannot, as
such, be conusant of the necessities of the state; and if they were, and knew
them to be ever so pressing, they must act according to one rule; and must
order a pension . . . to be paid with the very money, which ought to be
employed, and possibly was provided by parliament, for suppressing a rebellion,
or resisting an invasion, or setting out a fleet.
For they, as a court of justice, have no judgment of discretion allowed them:
whenever the party comes to pray it, the grant must be inrolled and allowed,
and the judgment given, and the writ go.
Id. at 103.
567. See Macbeath v. Haldiman, I Term R. 172 (K.B., Durnford & East's Reps. 1785-
1787).
568. See supra notes 256-68, 281-84, 503-05 and accompanying text.
569. See Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 290-91 (1850).
570. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 149 n.35, 95 S. Ct. 335,
361 n.35 (1974).
571. E.g., Carter v. State, 42 La. Ann. 927, 8 So. 836 (1890); Carr v. State, 127
Ind. 204, 26 N.E. 778 (1891); Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Chambers, 169 Cal. 131,
145 P. 1025 (1915). But see State v. Yalle, 199 Wash. 70, 90 P.2d 263 (1939).
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In 1977 Congress challenged the wisdom of Lord Somers's axiom
by amending the Automatic Payment of Judgment Act to remove the
$100,000 payment limitation. 72 After twenty-one years, Congress ap-
parently concluded that the problems created by the $100,000 limit (i.e.,
delays,573 added interest costs, 574 apportionment questions 7') outweighed
the risk that any isolated judgment would seriously jeopardize its 400
billion dollar budget.576 In the words of a Senate report, the amendment
would result in a "permanent appropriation to pay future claims and
judgments." '"77 The historical significance of this practical judgment which
Congress reached in adopting a routine supplemental appropriations
bill-was not lost on the Court of Claims. 7 8 That court described the
1977 amendment in its official history as follows:
In 1855 Congress would not even permit a final judgment,
reserving to itself the right to second-guess the court. By 1866
the court [of claims] could enter a final judgment but Congress
still reserved the right, though [largely] unused . . ., to challenge
a court judgment by refusing to pay it. One hundred and eleven
years later it cut the court from this financial apron string. The
court had served its probationary period, if you can call it that,
and after 122 years Congress formally announced that it would
not be necessary to maintain any oversight of the judgments .
. . .In a sense, it is the ultimate compliment that a sovereign
would leave its purse standing open "permanently and .
indefinitely" in this way.179
Theoretically, the 1977 amendment also rendered moot the question
of the essentialness of enforceability to the exercise of Article III
jurisdiction 8 0 by providing a funding source out of which judgments
could be judicially enforced. 8' Thus, movement toward a "judicial
model" of enforcement has, in a sense, been achieved at the federal
572. Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-26, 91 Stat. 61, 96-
97 (1980) (codified and reorganized at 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1983)).
573. 2 W. Cowen, P. Nichols & M. Bennett, supra note 88, at 161.
574. Id.
575. United States v. Maryland, 349 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v.
Varner, 400 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1968).
576. The federal government spent $400,506,000,000 in the 1977 fiscal year. Executive
Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 1984 9-55 (1984) (Table 24 compiling budget outlays from 1789-
1984).
577. S. Rep. No. 64, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 173 (1977).
578. 2 W. Cowen, P. Nichols & M. Bennett, supra note 88, at 161-62.
579. Id.
580. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. at 568-71, 82 S. Ct. at 1482-84.
581. See Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
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level through legislative acquiescence rather than through judicial
assertion 58 2 of an inherent enforcement power.583
4. A "Judicial Model" of Organization
In 1982 Congress took a major step toward integrating the adjudication
of government claims into the normal federal court structure.5 4 In theory,
the Court of Claims was a trial court . 85 However, over time the growth
of its caseload forced it to evolve a two-tier structure that consisted of
an appellate division composed of its Article III judges and a trial
division composed of commissioners appointed by the court itself. 86 The
commissioners, who were not Article III judges, had no power to enter
final judgments, and therefore all their findings and recommendations
were subject to "appeal" to the Article III judges for final disposition. 87
582. It has been subsequently argued, however, that the federal judiciary may well
possess the authority to enforce money judgments against the United States even without
a specific appropriation. See Stewart, The Enforcement of Judgments Against the United
States, 12 Creighton L. Rev. 815 (1979).
583. During the 1980's a few state courts, most notably in California, asserted broad
powers of enforcement if the legislature had unreasonably refused to pay a valid judgment.
In Mandel v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 531, 629 P.2d 935, 174 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1981), the
California Supreme Court upheld an order which compelled the state controller to pay
a $25,000 judgment from a department's general operating budget despite the fact that
the California Legislature, on two occasions, refused to appropriate the necessary funds.
Rather than assuming the "good faith" of the legislature, the California Supreme Court
found that the legislature's refusal stemmed not from a lack of funds or more pressing
budget priorities but from a legislative redetermination of the merits of the case. Id. at
538, 629 P.2d at 938, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 844. The court concluded that this violated the
separation of powers. Id. at 549, 629 P.2d at 946, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 852. While it
recognized that it could not compel the legislature to appropriate funds, id. at 539, 629
P.2d at 939, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 845, the California Supreme Court held that it could
invalidate any restriction against payment placed on funds appropriated to the judgment
debtor agency which would otherwise be available for the payment of such judgment.
Id. at 539-42, 545-51, 629 P.2d at 939-41, 943-47, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 845-47, 849-53. A
subsequent California case indicated that the size of the judgment and its disruptive impact
on the agency's programs were important factors in determining whether funds were
otherwise available. See California State Employees' Assn. v. Cory, 123 Cal. App. 3d
888, 176 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1981) (refusal to order payment of $18,000,000). Another case
ordered payment out of an agency's unexpended, unencumbered funds. Serrano v. Priest,
131 Cal. App. 3d 188, 182 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1982). For a critique, see Note, Mandel v.
Myers: Judicial Encroachment on Legislative Spending Powers, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 932
(1982).
584. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (1983)).
585. Although they seldom did so, the Article III judges of the Court of Claims were
authorized to sit as trial judges. See 2 W. Cowen, P. Nichols & M. Bennett, supra note
88, at 91.
586. See id. at 90-95. After 1973, the commissioners' title was redesignated to that
of "trial judges." Id. at 90 n.14.
587. Id. at 90-91; H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1981).
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The only exception was for congressional reference cases.5 8  The Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the Court of Claims and
reorganized its two-tier structure into two new courts. 89
The act created the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit by merging the appellate division of the Court of Claims with
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.5 90 The new appellate court
functions as one of the Article III circuit courts of appeal except that
its jurisdiction, like that of its predecessor courts, is defined by subject
matter rather than geography. 9' One of the Federal Courts Improvement
Act's major purposes was to integrate the specialized appellate juris-
diction of the merged courts into the general federal court structure.
The House report stated that the bill "provides the judges of the new
court with a breadth of jurisdiction that rivals in its variety that of the
regional court of appeals. The proposed . . . court is not a 'specialized
court.' . . . Rather, it has a varied docket spanning a broad range of
legal issues and types of cases." 5 92
The Act also reconstituted the trial division of the Court of Claims
into an Article I trial court called the United States Claims Court.5 93
The major purpose of the reorganization was to confer the trial juris-
diction of the Court of Claims on "trial judges whose status is upgraded
and who are truly independent." 5 94 To this end, the new Claims Court
is authorized to render final judgments and to grant equitable relief. 95
It also elevates the former commissioners to the status of "judges"
who, after a transitional period, are eligible for presidential reappoint-
ment for lengthy fifteen-year terms.5 96 Finally, the new court assumes
588. See supra note 533.
589. See supra note 584.
590. Id.
591. H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1981). The House Report
summarized the jurisdiction of the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as
follows:
It will handle all patent appeals and some agency appeals, as well as all other
matters that are now considered by the CCPA or the Court of Claims. The
Court of Claims decides cases involving federal contracts, civil tax issues if the
government is the defendant, Indian claims, military and civilian pay disputes,
patents, inverse condemnation, and various other matters. The CCPA decides
patent and customs cases from several sources, and those cases often include
allegations of [the] defenses of "misues, fraud, inequitable conduct, violation
of the antitrust laws, breach of trade secret agreements, unfair competition, and
such common law claims as unjust enrichment."
Id. at 19.
592. Id.
593. 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1983).
594. H.R. Rep., supra note 591, at 25.
595. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491(a), 2505 (1983).
596. See 28 U.S.C. § 172(a) (1983); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-164, title I, § 167, 96 Stat. 50, 51 (1982).
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the jurisdiction of the trial division of the Court of Claims, including
its responsibility to determine congressional reference cases. 9 According
to a House report, the Article I designation was required "[blecause .
. . existing law gives the trial judges [i.e., commissioners] of the Court
of Claims jurisdiction to hear Congressional reference cases, which are
not 'cases and controversies' in the constitutional sense .... "598 Thus,
the need to preserve congressional reference jurisdiction, rather than a
desire to reassert congressional hegemony over claims, appears to have
been the reason for retaining the non-Article III status of the Claims
Court.
Was the 1982 reorganization consistent with the 1962 decision in
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, which reasserted an Article III basis for claims? 99
A case decided shortly after the adoption of the 1982 Act suggests that
it was. In Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of bankruptcy courts created by
Congress in 1978.6 0 In a footnote, the Supreme Court suggested that
with regard to "public rights" such as government claims, while "the
presumption is in favor of Art. III courts" under Glidden, "when
Congress assigns these matters to administrative agencies, or to legislative
courts, it has generally provided, and we have suggested that it may be
required to provide, for Art. III judicial review. ' 60 1 This footnote appears
to ratify the present arrangement created by the Federal Courts Im-
provement Act of 1982 whereby most jurisdiction over government claims
is exercised by the Article I Claims Court whose decisions are reviewable
by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
CONCLUSION
Over the past three centuries, American attitudes toward claims have
evolved slowly but no less dramatically as the focus has shifted from
the legislative hall to the courthouse. As indicated, in 1680 the Virginia
House of Burgesses already possessed a standing committee on public
claims, 602 and by 1715 it had become so protective of this responsibility
that it ordered the prosecution of judges who neglected to receive and
transmit claims to it.60 Nowadays, by contrast, Congress has waived
most immunity, and the United States may be sued in the federal courts
for almost all legal claims. 6°4 A continuing appropriation ensures the
prompt payment of judgments. 605
597. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1492 (1983).
598. H.R. Rep., supra note 591, at 32.
599. See supra notes 512-32 and accompanying text.
600. See 458 U.S. 50, 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
601. Id. at 69 n.23, 102 S. Ct. at 2870 n.23.
602. See supra notes 22-24.
603. See supra note 47.
604. See supra notes 538-48 and accompanying text.
605. See supra notes 572-77 and accompanying text.
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The apparent triumph of the "judicial model" however, does not
mean that the colonial "legislative model" has been vanquished. Certain
remnants remain. For instance, Congress continues to determine moral
and intentional tort claims itself, pursuant to its own procedure. 6°6
Moreover, its desire to retain its congressional reference power has
affected the constitutional status of the new Claims Court. 6° 7 The most
significant vestiges, however, lie just below the surface. Although Con-
gress has waived most immunity, the Supreme Court's continued ad-
herence to the sovereign immunity doctrine, if taken at face value,
suggests that a congressional return to the "legislative model" is still a
judicially acceptable course of conduct. Moreover, if Congress repealed
the continuing appropriation for the payment of judgments, there would
again be no means of judicial enforcement. This does not mean that
the present "judicial model" is any less "real." It does mean, however,
that today's triumph may be a fleeting one. What Congress gives today,
it may theoretically withdraw tomorrow. In this sense, the "legislative
model" still persists in present judicial theory if not in current everyday
practice.
There is an historic irony in the present situation. The "legislative
model" lost popular support well before the Civil War and its last
significant congressional support shortly after World War II. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court-the very institution which once challenged
the validity of the colonial "legislative model" under the new Consti-
tution in 1792 in Hayburn's Case and in 1793 in Chisholm68-has become
its last bastion of modern support. We have come full circle. It is time
that the Court reviewed its continued adherence to old doctrines, such
as sovereign immunity, that have clearly outlived their historical use-
fulness. 6°9 Over half of the state courts have already abolished or abridged
606. See generally Gellhorn & Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort Claims Against
the United States, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1955); Glosser, Congressional Reference Cases
in the United States Court of Claims: A Historical and Current Perspective, 25 Am. U.L.
Rev. 595 (1976); Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1684 (1966). There
is nothing inappropriate with Congress's power to determine moral claims through private
legislation. Gellhorn and Lauer recognize this when they state:
Civilized communities, valuing equality of treatment for those similarly situated
and therefore preferring rules of general application, nevertheless realize that
not all persons are in similar circumstances. Attentive to the limitations of
general rules, they thus recognize the appropriateness of treating exceptional
cases differently. . . . [W]hile maintaining a preference for general legislation,
we affirm the continued value of private legislation.
Gellhorn & Lauer, supra, at 36.
607. See supra notes 593-98 and accompanying text.
608. See supra notes 100-40 and accompanying text.
609. In Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 907 (1984),
the Court reaffirmed the proposition that "the principle of sovereign immunity is a
constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III .... ."
Moreover, the Court continues to construe broadly congressional exemptions from liability.
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this doctrine. 610 For a "new" constitutional theory to explain the present
"judicial model," the Supreme Court need only consult a couple of its
old cases from 1792 and 1793. It needn't worry. The Constitution has
not much changed.
See, e.g., Kosak v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1519 (1984) (exemption for claims "arising
in respect of" detention of goods by customs officials).
610. See K. Davis, supra note 564, § 25.00.
